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CONSIDERATION OF "CONTRACTING
CULTURE" IN ENFORCING ARBITRATION
PROVISIONS
AMY J. SCHMITZt

INTRODUCTION
Form contract provisions requiring binding arbitration are
becoming increasingly important due to their rising prevalence in
Furthermore, most
a wide variety of contracting contexts.
countries, including the United States, strictly enforce
agreements to arbitrate as signatories to the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(commonly referred to as the "New York Convention").1
Meanwhile, domestic and international rhetoric touts the virtues
of agreements requiring non-binding dispute resolution processes
such as mediation, conciliation, or negotiation (I refer to these
contracts as "ADR Agreements" to distinguish them from
contracts requiring binding arbitration under the New York
Convention, and the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") in the
2
United States).
Nonetheless, some commentators and policymakers have
become skeptical of pre-dispute arbitration clauses because they
require parties to waive rights to judicial recourse at a time when
parties may not anticipate the development of disputes.
t Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. I thank Nestor
Davidson, Christopher Drahozal, and Mark Loewenstein for their comments, and
Melissa Pingley, Matthew Peters, and Andra Zeppelin for their research assistance.
1 In the United States, courts must enforce arbitration agreements and awards
under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000) (covering
domestic arbitration); §§ 201-08 (implementing the Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention")); §§ 301-07
(implementing the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration ("Panama Convention")).
2 See Amy J. Schmitz, Refreshing ContractualAnalysis of ADR Agreements by
Curing Bipolar Avoidance of Modern Common Law, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 5-8
(2004) [hereinafter Schmitz, Refreshing Contractual Analysis] (distinguishing
binding arbitration from non-binding "ADR").
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Furthermore, United States law has diverged from law in many
other countries by enforcing pre-dispute arbitration clauses that
"repeat players," such as large retailers and manufacturers,
routinely include in their form consumer contracts. 3 These
repeat players justify such clauses as allowing them to reduce
dispute resolution costs, while others criticize the use of
arbitration as a means for curbing consumer remedies and
preventing class actions.
In addition, critics of consumer
arbitration question whether it improperly impedes the
development of law and shields the public from information
regarding health, safety, and other policy concerns. 4 In this way,
arbitration may allow private parties to escape public regulation
5
and essentially to privatize law.
United States courts have nonetheless condoned such use of
arbitration. The United States Supreme Court has used the FAA
to effectuate a pro-arbitration policy that has prevented courts
from vigilantly policing the use of arbitration. 6 In addition,
courts have confirmed the limited review and finality of
arbitration awards. 7 This has left parties with one avenue for
3 Although other countries may enforce consumer arbitration provisions in
certain contexts, most do not enforce non-negotiable form provisions in consumer
contracts. See Jean R. Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN
AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127, 129-31, 138-40 (2006) [hereinafter
Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration] (highlighting American law's enforcement of
mandatory consumer arbitration under pre-dispute form contracts).
4 See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54
KANSAS L. REV. 101 (2006) [hereinafter Schmitz, Privacy Paradox] (discussing
privacy in arbitration).
5 See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 704-12, 754 (1999) (discussing how
"[a]rbitration privatizes the creation of law"); see also Amy J. Schmitz, Mobile-Home
Mania? ProtectingProcedurallyFairArbitration in a Consumer Microcosm, 20 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 291, 313-15, 371 (2005) [hereinafter Schmitz, Mobile-Home
Mania] (discussing how manufacturers' use of form arbitration agreements has
privatized dispute resolution in the mobile home industry).
6 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-91 (2000)
(finding that the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements" supported
enforcement of an arbitration agreement although the agreement was silent with
respect to arbitration costs and fees) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (holding that the FAA applies to arbitration
agreements in employment contracts despite the Act's exclusion for "workers
engaged in ...interstate commerce").
7 See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality
Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 124-32 (2002) [hereinafter
Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl] (discussing the finality of arbitration awards under
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challenging arbitration agreements:
general common law
contract defenses.
Meanwhile, this avenue is narrowing as
courts become increasingly formalistic in applying contract
defenses. Formalist law and efficiency concerns have prompted
courts to shy away from substantive consideration of consent,
8
contractual context, or repeat-player advantages.
In relational contract theory and elsewhere, however,
scholars have highlighted the importance of context, particularly
within close-knit exchange communities. 9
Indeed, this is
particularly important in assessing the fairness and legitimacy of
standardized pre-dispute arbitration provisions. This Article
therefore seeks to remind courts of the importance of exchange
context by proposing a "contracting culture" continuum that
acknowledges the impacts of these provisions in a particular
communal context. This continuum analysis also highlights the
over-and-under-inclusiveness of current pro- and anti-arbitration
arguments.
"Contracting culture" encompasses economic and noneconomic relational factors that impact dispute resolution
agreements, but go beyond common conceptions of "culture"
focused on ethnicity, nationality, or religion.
This Article
therefore explores beyond the primary domestic versus
international factors 10 and proposes a continuum of contracting
the FAA and UAA).
8 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108-09 (9th Cir.
2002) (enforcing form arbitration provision in employment agreement, despite

absence of bargaining).
9 See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 172426, 1745, 1787 (2001) (exploring the cotton industry's development and use of a
private legal system ("PLS")); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 55-57, 62, 65, 67 (1963)
[hereinafter Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations] (analyzing contextual relations
in commercial exchanges); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72
NW. U. L. REV. 854, 855, 859, 873-74 (1978) [hereinafter Macneil, Contracts]
(analyzing relational nature of long-term contracts); Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the FederalArbitrationAct, 77 N.C.
L. REV. 931, 976-79, 992-1035 (1999) (explaining the communal development of
arbitration and proposing self-regulation as a template for interpreting and applying
the FAA).
10 See, e.g., Ilhyung Lee, The Law and Culture of the Apology in Korean Dispute
Settlement (with Japan and the United States in Mind), 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 5-6,
21-28 (2005) (discussing the differing roles of apology in Korean dispute resolution);
Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Frank E. A. Sander, Culture, Negotiation, and the Eye of the
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cultures ranging from "intra communal" to "extra communal" in
order to highlight how parties' relations, understandings, and
values may have the greatest impact on the fairness of form
arbitration provisions.
This "contracting culture" continuum also borrows from
Professor Ian Macneil's "relational contracts," and his
consideration of course of performance, course of dealing, usage
of trade, and industry norms. It considers his critique of classical
contract doctrine's formalistic "presentiation" and narrow focus
on exchange as bound by present events of offer and acceptance
at the time of contract.1 1
Nonetheless, this Article also
emphasizes emotions, incentives, and practical factors impacting
a given relationship.
In addition, the Article applies its continuum analysis
specifically to a unique microcosm of contracts-form pre-dispute
arbitration provisions-and considers how this analysis differs in
construction versus consumer arbitration.
It uses the
commercial construction context as an example of a more intra
communal contracting culture and consumer contracting as an
example of a more extra communal culture.
Commercial
construction may be more intra communal in that it generally
involves parties who share connections and understandings
regarding industry norms and dispute resolution systems that
operate in the industry. 12 In contrast, consumer contracting is
often more extra communal to the extent consumers and sellers
often have disproportionate bargaining power that augments
their differing needs, expectations, and understandings
regarding dispute resolution.
Part I of the Article explains the creation of dispute
resolution agreements and the proliferation of form arbitration
provisions.
Part II summarizes how United States courts
generally have enforced these form provisions and procedures
without deeply or adequately considering communal or relational
context.
Part III questions this formalistic enforcement by
Beholder, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 249, 250-53 (1991) (highlighting the importance of
considering cultural differences relating to ethnicity or nationality and recognizing
similar differences due to race, gender, and age).
11 See Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation,60
VA. L. REv. 589, 589-93 (1974) (critiquing "presentiation" in classical law).
12 I specify commercial construction to distinguish residential construction
disputes between contractors and consumers, which often involve relational realities
that would be more extra communal on my suggested continuum.
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proposing the "contracting culture" continuum, using commercial
construction as an example of a more intra communal
contracting culture and consumer contracting as a culture often
leaning toward the extra communal end of the continuum. Part
IV applies this continuum analysis and suggests that courts
should more clearly consider contracting culture in assessing the
enforceability of form arbitration provisions using contract tools
such as the unconscionability doctrine. Contracting culture may
aggravate or counteract unfairness that may otherwise flow from
economic and resource imbalances, and it may be the key factor
in determining whether the provision is legally unconscionable.
I.

PROLIFERATION OF FORM ARBITRATION PROVISIONS

International and domestic arbitration laws generally
require enforcement of valid agreements to arbitrate, but do not
specify formation standards for these agreements or process rules
for arbitration proceedings. 13 Parties' arbitration agreements are
therefore powerful roadmaps for resolution of their disputes.
Furthermore,
parties rarely negotiate
their arbitration
agreements after disputes develop. Instead, they usually become
subject to form arbitration clauses in their pre-dispute
contracts. 14 In addition, these clauses often incorporate unnegotiated arbitration rules promulgated by administering
institutions, such as the American Arbitration Association
("AAA"), the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), or the
National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"). 15 This
results in a pro-forma regime that is dependent on context for its
fairness and efficiency.
A.

Loose Legislative Regulation of Arbitration

Legislation governing private dispute resolution is generally
broad and says very little about the procedures that should or
must apply in a given dispute resolution process. Governments
13 Richard E. Speidel, Common Legal Issues in American Arbitration Law, in
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 29, 31-34.
14 See, e.g., Schmitz, Mobile-Home Mania, supra note 5, at 314-16 (describing
use of form arbitration clauses and one-sided bargaining in mobile home sales and
financing transactions).
1 See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Quiet Revolution: Securities Arbitration
Confronts the Hard Questions, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 327 (1996) (discussing how
arbitration under NASD or NYSE rules has become mandatory under most brokerdealer contracts).
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are understandably reluctant to regulate parties' negotiations or
otherwise infringe on their autonomy. With respect to mediation
in the United States, for example, states generally have declined
to legislate particularized procedures or require summary
16
enforcement of agreements to submit disputes to mediation.
Instead, states have adopted the Uniform Mediation Act ("UMA")
or other statutes that provide loose standards with respect to
17
confidentiality, mediator conduct, and fair bargaining.
International and domestic arbitration laws generally have
more force to the extent they mandate summary enforcement of
arbitration agreements and awards. There are currently 138
countries that have ratified the 1958 New York Convention, a
United Nations sponsored treaty that has fueled the development
and growth of international commercial arbitration.' 8
This
treaty requires signatory nations to implement legislation that
directs courts to compel arbitration under valid arbitration
agreements and to enforce arbitration awards. 19 Although the
16 See Uniform Mediation Act ("UMA") § 5(i) (Draft 1999), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/medam99.htm (reporting that "[p]rovisions
to provide summary and immediate enforcement of agreements to mediate
(including mediation clauses), in contrast to arbitration clauses, are uncommon,"
and citing only two statutes calling for such enforcement, both of which apply only to
conciliation in international disputes).
17 See UMA §§ 1-16 (2001), reprinted in 22 N. ILL. UNIV. L. REV. 165 (2002)
(stating rules for confidentiality, mediator privileges and disclosures, and party
representation, but not addressing enforceability of mediation agreements); Michael
B. Getty, The Process of Drafting the Uniform Mediation Act, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
157, 161-62 (2002) (discussing the UMA and loose regulations under state and
federal statutes); Elizabeth Strong, The Uniform Mediation Act, An Opportunity To
Enhance Confidentiality in Business Mediation, 7 ADR CURRENTS 5, 6 (June-Aug.
2002) (discussing confidentiality focus of UMA); see also Schmitz, Refreshing
Contractual Analysis, supra note 2, at 12-14 (discussing the aim of UMA and its
main provisions).
18 ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 67 (3d ed. 1999); THE NEW YORK CONVENTION ON THE

RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, arts. 1-16 (1958),
reprinted in id. at 491-94 app. A [hereinafter NY CONVENTION]; U.N.

Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Status: 1958-Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConvention-status.
html (last visited Oct. 17, 2006). See generally INT'L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (ICCA), INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(Jan Paulsson et. al eds., 2006) [hereinafter ARBITRATION HANDBOOK] (generally
discussing international commercial arbitration).
19 See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 18, at 67-68, 135-44 (noting the

centrality of arbitration agreements); Kenneth F. Dunham, InternationalArbitration
Is Not Your Father'sOldsmobile, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 323, 326-27 (2005) (discussing
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Convention allows for some public policy review of arbitration
awards, it generally protects the discretion of arbitrators and
20
does not mandate particular procedures or formation standards.
The thrust of the treaty and other international principles is to
promote enforcement of private commercial arbitration agree21
ments according to their terms.
In the United States, the FAA implements the New York
Convention and requires the same enforcement for domestic
arbitration agreements and awards. 22 Similarly, the Uniform
Arbitration Act ("UAA") is model legislation that nearly all states
have adopted to require the same basic enforcement for local
arbitration agreements and awards beyond the purview of the
FAA. 23 Again, these laws do not dictate formation standards for
arbitration provisions or mandate many procedural requirements
Instead, they prescribe nearly
for arbitration proceedings.
identical schemes for mandating that courts specifically enforce
arbitration agreements according to their terms. 2 4 In addition,
they provide for liberal venue, immediate appeal from orders
adverse to arbitration, appointment of arbitrators if parties

the development of international commercial arbitration and noting the importance
of the New York Convention in that development); see also STEVEN C. BENNETT,
ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS 134-36 (2002) (describing basics of
international arbitration law); Leonardo D. Graffi, Securing Harmonized Effects of
Arbitration Agreements Under the NY Convention, 28 HOUs. J. INT'L L. 663, 679-91
(2006) (discussing the general enforcement requirements of the Convention, but also
noting how countries do not uniformly apply these requirements).
20 NY CONVENTION, supra note 18, at arts. 1-16; see also REDFERN & HUNTER,
supra note 18, at 67-68, 135-44 (discussing centrality of the agreement and
institutional rules incorporated therein to dictate arbitration procedures); Dunham,
supra note 19, at 330-31 (discussing common incorporation of arbitral institutions'
rules and analyzing these rules due to their importance in dictating the rules of
engagement in arbitration procedures).
21 See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 18, at 135 (describing the agreement to
arbitrate as "the foundation stone"); see also UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, arts. 35-36 (1985) (providing some
procedures but focusing on requiring enforcement of arbitration agreements and
awards).
22 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000); see also Howard M. Holtzman & Donald F. Donovan,
United States, in ARBITRATION HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 44 (Supp. 2005).
23 See UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT (UAA) prefatory note (2000), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edufbll/ulc/uarba/arbitratl213.htm. Although much of the
discussion focuses on the FAA, the discussion equally implicates application of the
FAA's state law twin, the UAA, which has been adopted or is substantially similar to
the law in forty-nine jurisdictions. Id.
24 Id.
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cannot do so by agreement, limited review of arbitration awards,
25
and treatment of awards as final judgments.
This leaves private dispute resolution provisions and
procedures to parties' agreements. 26 Parties generally do not
devote time or resources to negotiating dispute resolution
agreements, however, because they usually incorporate these
agreements in their pre-dispute contracts. It is not until legal
battles erupt that the parties become concerned with the fairness
of procedures that they have previously accepted in their initial
27
contracts.
B.

Prevalenceof Form ArbitrationProvisions

As noted above, it is rare for parties to an ADR or arbitration
agreement to specifically negotiate the terms of the agreement
and the rules that will apply in their chosen dispute resolution
process. Instead, these contracting parties usually decline to
invest time or resources discussing the rules that will apply in
possible private dispute resolution proceedings, and focus on key
terms such as price, timing, and performance standards.
Professor Stewart Macaulay found in his early 1960s study of
business relations, for example, that business exchanges usually
focus on "description, contingencies, defective performances and
legal sanction," but reflect little to no planning "concerning legal
sanctions and the effect of defective performances." 28
This
generally is efficient and cost effective when it saves the
contracting parties from wasting resources wrangling over
details of future sanctions and dispute resolution proceedings
29
that they are very unlikely to use.
25 See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 931 (10th Cir. 2001)
(emphasizing the FAA's special remedial scheme); Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl,
supra note 7, at 125, 145-51 (2002) (discussing the FAA's remedial provisions and
emphasizing how they ensure finality of arbitration awards).
26 For further discussion of the contractual focus of arbitration law, see
generally Steven J. Ware, InterstateArbitration:Chapter 1 of the FederalArbitration
Act, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 88-126 (proposing reforms
aimed at solidifying the contractual approach).
27 See Schmitz, Mobile-Home Mania, supra note 5, at 334-44 (discussing
consumer challenges of arbitration agreements in mobile home cases); see also infra
Part IV (discussing unconscionability and other claims challenging arbitration
agreements based on procedures denying class relief or attorneys' fees).
28 Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations, supra note 9, at 60.
29 See Tarek F. Abdalla, Litigation vs. Arbitration: Which Is Better for the
Commercial Dispute?, PRAC. LITIGATOR, Sept. 2005, at 47, 52-53 (discussing the
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Furthermore, parties to a pre-dispute agreement looking
forward to a peaceful and productive contracting relationship are
usually reluctant to raise thorny issues of eventual disputes,
especially in intra communal contexts. 30 As Professor Macaulay
found in his study, "[d]etailed negotiated contracts can get in the
way of creating good exchange relationships between business
units."31 Raising pre-contract concerns with conflict can push
parties away from a deal or spark needless hostilities.3 2 It can
inject an adversarial air into the contracting atmosphere and
taint the process with negativity. Parties may also want to avoid
appearing persnickety by questioning boilerplate, which now
commonly governs status relationships such as those in the
consumer/seller context. 33
Efficiency concerns and relational realities, therefore,
continue to make it unlikely that parties will take action to
negotiate the terms of a form dispute resolution agreement. 34 In
addition, studies indicate that negotiators prefer form provisions
that operate without parties having to take action, even if those
terms are contrary to standard industry practice or legal
defaults. 35 Contracting parties are therefore unlikely to take
action to seek changes in form arbitration clauses, even when

logic of basic arbitration clauses); see also Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations,
supra note 9, at 58-60 (explaining why standardized contracts without a lot of "red
tape" are often cost effective and practical in business exchanges).
30 See Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 9, at 64 (explaining
how detailed negotiations can turn "a cooperative venture into an antagonistic horse
trade").
31 Id. at 64 (emphasizing the importance of non-contractual relations in
fostering good business relations).
32 See id.; see also Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract
Negotiation: The PsychologicalPower of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1583, 1609 (1998) (reporting and explaining the results of a contracting study
that tested the power of default contract provisions, and noting how negotiators may
avoid proposing departures from status quo contract terms because of fear that the
proposal could lead to a bargaining impasse).
33 See Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A
Comparative Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMoRY INT'L L. REV. 1, 29-30
(2002).
34 See Korobkin, supra note 32, at 1586-87, 1605-09, 1627 (finding in support of
his "inertia theory" that negotiators generally prefer any terms that operate without
the parties' specific bargaining to the contrary and explaining how parties favor
inaction due to the fear of regretting action that later breeds undesirable results).
35 See id. at 1607-09 (reporting how action versus inaction proved more
powerful than Coasean theory might expect).
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these clauses bar class relief or other remedies that the parties
36
would otherwise have under statutes or legal defaults.
Courts nonetheless endorse this pro-forma regime with
respect to arbitration under the FAA and the Convention. 37 This
is in contrast to their uncertain and ambiguous enforcement of
ADR agreements for mediation or conciliation. Parties' ADR
agreements usually do not specify procedures for these nonbinding ADR processes because parties seek to maintain the
flexibility and freedom to craft procedures as they go through a
process. Additionally, ambiguous law governing these agreements leaves parties uncertain whether and how a court would
38
even compel parties to comply with any procedural terms.
Meanwhile, parties to pre-dispute arbitration contracts often
do specify some procedural and remedial rules that will apply in
any arbitration proceedings. Drafters of form provisions may
provide for ad hoc arbitration that they administer themselves,
under procedures that they direct, or they may incorporate all or
some procedural rules promulgated by private arbitration
administrators, such as the AAA, ICC, or NASD. 39 This fosters
pro-forma contracting that coincides with rational actor theory.
It is rare for negotiators to take the time to read form rules
incorporated in their arbitration clauses. 40 This is even true for
individuals unfamiliar with arbitration, who decline to expend
their limited resources in seeking to learn about or challenge
onerous limitations and procedures under these clauses.
Accordingly, pre-dispute arbitration forms have become the
norm in a variety of contracting contexts. Their fairness and
efficiency, however, depends on the extent to which the parties
36 See id. at 1627. This gives companies that draft form arbitration provisions
considerable power in setting the rules that will apply in any arbitration
proceedings. See id.
37 See, e.g., Dunham, supra note
19, at 326-27 (highlighting the role of
arbitration rules parties incorporate in their agreements in the international
commercial context).
38 See Amy J. Schmitz, Confronting ADR Agreements' Contract/No-Contract
Conundrum with Good Faith, 56 DEPAuL L. REV. 55 (2006) (critiquing ambiguity
regarding enforceability of ADR agreements, and proposing that courts use implied
duties of good faith to properly enforce them).
39 See Dunham, supra note 19, at 331-40 (discussing the arbitration rules of the
LCIA and ICC as well as other international arbitration rules).
40 See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203-04, 1206-17 (2003) (discussing how
buyers do not make fully rational contracting choices, often because they do not
expend the time and resources necessary to maximize the accuracy of their choices).
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share goals, needs, expectations, and understandings regarding
arbitration.
It is problematic, however, when those with
bargaining power lack adequate incentive to draft their
arbitration forms to protect individuals' interests. Reputation or
other concerns may not be enough, for example, to prompt
repeat-player manufacturers with bargaining power and
resources to contractually require publication of awards
41
revealing their statutory violations or other misconduct.
Indeed, power, experience, understandings, and needs greatly
42
impact contracting and dispute resolution.
II. AMERICAN ENFORCEMENT OF FORM ARBITRATION
CLAUSES AND RULES

Despite fairness issues regarding form contracting, most
American courts enforce standard form contracts under the FAA
and formalist contract law. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's
federalization of arbitration prevents states from limiting
arbitration under valid contracts affecting interstate commerce,
and its pro-arbitration reading of the FAA has relegated
43
challenges of arbitration clauses to general contract defenses.
Meanwhile, American courts have lacked sympathy for contract
challenges of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. 44 Most courts
dispel criticisms that these clauses are nonconsensual by
assuming that parties are free to challenge these clauses or deal

41 See Schmitz, Privacy Paradox, supra note 4 (discussing the role of privacy).
Nonetheless, securities law may require companies to reveal information regarding
their legal scuffles in certain public filings.
42 See Michael Hunter Schwartz, Power Outage: Amplifying the Analysis of
Power in Legal Relations (With Special Application to Unconscionability and
Arbitration), 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 67, 77-85, 144 (1997) (discussing the
importance of power and proposing analysis that illuminates how "contracts and
arbitration are part of an overarching institution through which power pervades our
lives").
43 See Doctor's Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (finding the
FAA preempted state law requiring express notice of arbitration clauses and
emphasizing that the FAA only permits challenges of arbitration clauses based on
generally applicable state contract defenses); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272-73, 282 (1995) (holding that the FAA covered a
consumers' extermination contract and therefore preempted an Alabama law
limiting consumer arbitration); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984)
(determining that the FAA applies in federal and state court).
44 See Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair"Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 695, 695-97 (2001) [hereinafter Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses]
(describing the courts' enforcement of arbitration clauses).
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elsewhere. 45
Courts also steadily deny claims that form
arbitration clauses overly burden statutory rights or are
46
otherwise unconscionable.
Assumed Assent
Will theory underlying classical and modern contract law
47
generally endorses strict enforcement of contract terms.
Moreover, many courts and commentators propose that strict
enforcement of form terms fosters industrialization and vitality

A.

of an efficient market economy. 48 Many also assume that form

arbitration provisions foster efficiency and save costs that
corporations may pass on to consumers through lower prices and
better quality. 49 American courts therefore generally conclude
that individuals consent to non-negotiable form arbitration
clauses on the reasoning that they remain free to walk away from
a contract or seek needed goods or services elsewhere.
For example, in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,50 a court enforced
such an arbitration provision contained in computer purchase
terms that were buried among the papers that came with a
computer the Hills had purchased over the phone. 51 The Hills
45 See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-50 (7th Cir. 1997)
(finding assent to a form arbitration clause). But see Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the
Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1382-86 (1996) [hereinafter Stempel,
Bootstrapping] (critiquing the courts' "drifting away from, or perhaps abandoning
altogether, society's traditional notions of meaningful consent").
46 See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 744, 749, 754
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that Title VII did not preclude enforcement of an
arbitration clause in an employment contract); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294
F.3d 1104, 1108-10 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that, although the court has held form
arbitration clauses unconscionable in limited situations, the clause at issue was not
unconscionable because the employee could opt out of the arbitration program).
47 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860,

at 160-61 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1977).
48 See id. at 161.
49 See Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, supra note 44, at 741-54
(questioning claims that form arbitration provisions in consumer contracts are
unfair); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in
the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 435-51, 485-87 (2002) (discussing the
efficiency benefits of standard form contracts and explaining why electronic
contracts are not adhesion contracts).
50 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
51 See id. at 1148, 1151 (enforcing form computer purchase contract requiring
arbitration). But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan.
2000) (refusing to follow Hill regarding enforcement of same clause); Brower v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 251, 254, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572, 574 (1st Dep't
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claimed that they did not assent to the arbitration provision and
that the provision was unconscionable because it precluded class
relief, curtailed their right to recover attorney fees under the
Magnusson Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), and required them to
52
arbitrate their claims under ICC rules before ICC arbitrators.
The court rejected these claims, concluding that the Hills
assented to the terms by not returning the computer within 30
days, as the terms required under their "approve-or-return"
proviso.5 3 The court emphasized that such form contracting
fosters efficiency and gave little thought to shipping costs and
other burdens of requiring the Hills to return the computer in
54
order to reject boxed terms.
Applying this efficiency assumption, courts also find that
individuals assent to arbitration clauses added to their contracts
after initial contracting, especially when the individuals fail to
exercise an option to reject the arbitration terms. In Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Najd,5 5 for example, the court rejected an
employee's claim that he did not assent to a one-sided clause
requiring him to arbitrate that the employer provided to him
after he was hired. 56 The court found that Najd acknowledged
receipt of the agreement in writing and had thirty days to read
the document, consult counsel, and reject the agreement. The
57
court therefore concluded that Najd's silence constituted assent.
B.

Demise of the Public Policy Defense

Assumed consent to arbitration clauses has dovetailed with
courts' rejection of public policy claims that form arbitration
provisions and procedures overly burden claimants' ability to
enjoy meaningful access to statutory remedies.
Some commentators suggest courts should intervene to protect claimants
1998) (enforcing the identical Gateway arbitration clause but vacating the portion of
the clause requiring arbitration before the ICC due to the "excessive cost factor that
is necessarily entailed in arbitrating before the ICC"); see also Jean R. Sternlight,
Recent Decision Opens Wider Gateway to Unfair Binding Arbitration, 8 WORLD ARB.
& MEDIATION REP. 129, 130-32 (1997) [hereinafter Sternlight, Recent Decision]

(discussing Hill).
Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148-50.
at 1149 (stating that "approve-or-return" provisions such as that in Hill
make consumers better off "as a group").
54 Id. at 1149-50.
55 294 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002).
56 Id. at 1109.
57 Id. (highlighting how the circumstances supported assent by silence).
52

53 Id.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:123

from arbitration clauses that require them to forfeit statutory
58
remedies aimed to foster mandatory public policies.
Furthermore, some question remains whether the illusory nature
of individuals' consent to form arbitration provisions is adequate
to constitute waiver of these public rights, especially when these
individuals lack the power or experience to have a true voice in
59
crafting arbitration provisions and procedures.
Nonetheless, American courts generally have followed the
United States Supreme Court's lead in broadly interpreting
arbitration clauses to cover contract and statutory claims. 60 In
addition, they conclude that statutory claims generally may be
arbitrated on the assumption that contracting parties are free to
choose a forum for resolving disputes and that arbitration clauses
are little more than specialized forum selection clauses. 61 Under
this reasoning, the Supreme Court has condoned arbitration of
statutory claims covering employment discrimination, consumer
lending, and securities claims. 62 At the same time, the courts
have agreed that even arbitration of statutory claims does not
constitute state action subject to due process requirements of the
63
United States Constitution.
Most courts therefore have denied consumers' arguments
that they should not be compelled to arbitrate their claims under
the MMWA, which provides consumers with special warranty
protections and allows them to collect attorney fees in seeking to

58 See Ware, supra note 26, at 112-14 (proposing that even under a strict
contractual approach to arbitration courts should not enforce awards depriving
consumers of important mandatory rights).
59 See Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, supra note 3, at 143-44 (examining
consumer arbitration in America and explaining its mandatory nature); see also
Schmitz, Mobile-Home Mania, supra note 5, at 349 (questioning consumers' waiver
of warranty rights through pre-dispute arbitration clauses).
60 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (finding
that a statutory age discrimination statute could be subject to arbitration).
61 See id. at 26.
62 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 79, 82, 92 (2000) (finding
Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") claims under a consumer financing agreement may
be subject to binding arbitration under the FAA); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (holding age
discrimination statute arbitrable); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484-86 (1989) (overruling prior opinion that held
securities claims inarbitrable).
63 See Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The ConstitutionalImplications
of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1745-65 (2006) (noting
American courts' conclusion that private arbitration does not involve state action but
critiquing this conclusion with respect to arbitral class actions).
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enforce those protections. 64 For example, in Hill, discussed
above, the ICC rules incorporated in a form arbitration clause
required that the Hills pay roughly $4,000 in initial arbitration
costs in order to pursue their warranty claims against Gateway
regarding purchase of a $4,000 computer. 65 In addition, the ICC
rules did not provide the Hills access to needed discovery, and
the ICC's foreign headquarters created communication barriers
for the Hills. 66 The court nevertheless enforced the clause to
cover warranty claims, unconcerned that this would have a
chilling effect on consumers' vindication of their statutory
67
warranty rights.
Indeed, most courts reject individuals' challenges of
arbitration clauses based on claims that high initial costs in
arbitration preclude them from vindicating their rights under
statutes that provide for recovery of attorney fees. 68 They rely on
the Supreme Court's finding in Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Randolph69 that Randolph failed to prove such a cost claim. The
Court indicated that parties might be able to avoid arbitration
based on a sufficient showing of prohibitively high arbitration
costs under strong facts, but concluded that the Randolphs had
not satisfied that burden in seeking to avoid arbitration of their
Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") claims. 70 This, in turn, has
fostered courts' rejection of consumers' cost claims based on
insufficient showing of inability to pay and possibilities that
71
arbitrators may waive or reallocate truly oppressive fees.
A See Schmitz, Mobile-Home Mania, supra note 5, at 326-34 (discussing courts'
general allowance for arbitration of MMWA rights).
65 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, at 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1997);
Sternlight, Recent Decision, supra note 51, at 132; see also Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.,
104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D. Kan. 2000) (refusing to follow Hill regarding
enforcement of same clause); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 251,
676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (1st Dep't 1998) (analyzing identical arbitration clause);
66 Sternlight, Recent Decision, supra note 51, at 132.
67 See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148, 1151. But see Brower, 246 A.D.2d at 254, 676
N.Y.S.2d at 574 (enforcing the same arbitration clause, but finding the ICC costs
unconscionable and ordering arbitration before a mutually chosen or court appointed
arbitrator).
68 See, e.g., James v. McDonald's Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 678-80 (7th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting cost-based challenge of arbitration agreement).
69 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000) (holding TILA claims arbitrable despite possibly
high arbitration costs).
70 The Court found that, although Randolph had provided information
regarding high AAA arbitration fees and costs, it was not clear that she would bear
these costs and that she could not pay them. Id. at 90-91.
71 See James, 417 F.3d at 678-80 (rejecting cost-based claim due to insufficient
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Despite this high rate of failure, some individuals do prevail
on challenges of particular arbitration clauses that gut their
statutory rights. 72
In Ex parte Thicklin,73 for example, a
consumer successfully challenged an arbitration order based on
his argument that the MMWA precluded arbitration of his
express warranty claims against a mobile home manufacturer
since the arbitration provision was in his mobile home purchase
agreement with the retailer. 74 The Court concluded that the
manufacturer's failure to disclose the arbitration requirement in
its written warranty violated the MMWA's consumer disclosure
75
provisions.
Such results are nonetheless rare. Consumers usually fail
on claims that an arbitration agreement's preclusions of class
relief, recovery of punitive damages, or recovery of attorney fees
76
prevents them from vindicating their statutory rights.
Furthermore, even if they avoid arbitration of their statutory
claims, they often still must arbitrate their tort and contract
claims. 77 In addition, courts may indicate willingness to order
showing and also noting consumers would have to show that arbitration was truly
more expensive than litigation in terms of overall costs); see also Bailey v.
Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 346 F.3d 821, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2003) (reversing the
district court's denial of arbitration based on a cost challenge because such questions
of arbitrability were for the arbitrator under the parties' agreement). But see Ball v.
SFX Broad., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 230, 239-40 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding employee
could not be compelled to arbitrate her statutory claims because she had satisfied
the burden of proving prohibitive arbitration costs she could not bear).
72 See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHoZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 191-204 (2002) (quoting the Court in Gilmer and addressing how parties
challenge arbitration of statutory claims based on procedures required by a
particular arbitration agreement); see, e.g., ExparteThicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 728-30
(Ala. 2002) (consumer arguing that even if MMWA claims may be arbitrable, the
arbitration clause in this case was unenforceable under the Act).
73 824 So. 2d 723 (Ala. 2002).
74 Id. at 728-30 & n.2.
75 Id. at 730 & n.2; see also Homes of Legend, Inc. v. McCollough, 776 So. 2d
741, 746-48 (Ala. 2000) (construing an arbitration clause ostensibly calling for
binding arbitration per the AAA rules to require nonbinding arbitration in light of
the contract's warranty requiring compliance with the MMWA).
76 See Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1032-33
(11th Cir. 2003) (ordering arbitration, but finding an arbitrator must decide
mortgagors's argument that an arbitration provision precluding mortgagors from
recovering statutory punitive and treble damages violated the TILA).
77 Browne v. Kline Tysons Imps., Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827, 832-33 (E.D. Va.
2002) (allowing litigation of MMWA claims, but ordering arbitration of TILA and
state statutory and common law claims arising out of car sale); see also Ball v. SFX
Broad., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 230, 240 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (ordering only that the
employee did not have to arbitrate her statutory claims based on costs).
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arbitration if the corporation agrees to pay arbitration costs. 78
Courts also may order consumers to arbitrate warranty claims
79
against some, but not all, of the parties in an action.
Consequently, statutory arguments have provided little practical
fuel for challenging form arbitration provisions and procedures.
C. Application of Common Law Contract Defenses
American courts will not entertain constitutional challenges
to arbitration provisions or general arguments that arbitration is
"inherently unfair to consumers."80 Instead, the most feasible
challenges of arbitration provisions are based on general contract
defenses such as lack of consideration, unconscionability, and
fraud.8 1 Moreover, the Supreme Court has narrowed these court
82
challenges to those aimed at an arbitration clause itself.
Additionally, it has become increasingly difficult to prevail on
these challenges in light of most courts' pro-arbitration

78 See, e.g., Phillips v. Assocs. Home Equity Servs., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 840,
847 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (finding individual could not be compelled to arbitrate if required
to bear the prohibitive arbitration costs but stating that it would reconsider its
ruling if the defendants agreed to pay these costs).
79 Although some courts use third-party beneficiary and estoppel principles to
compel consumers to arbitrate claims against non-signatories to contracts containing
arbitration clauses, see Exparte Gates, 675 So. 2d 371, 373-75 (Ala. 1996) (enforcing
arbitration against a consumer on behalf of nonsignatory manufacturer based on
broad arbitration clause), others refuse to compel non-signatories to arbitrate. See
Ex parte Jones, 686 So. 2d 1166, 1167-68 (Ala. 1996) (concluding there was no
agreement to arbitrate between consumers and the non-signatory to the arbitration
agreement); Exparte Martin, 703 So. 2d 883, 886-87 (Ala. 1996) (holding arbitration
clause in loan agreement between buyers and sellers did not apply to manufacturer).
8o See Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 478 (5th Cir. 2002)
(citing United States Supreme Court cases for these findings); see also Richard C.
Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 589-91, 609-10 (1997) (critiquing American courts'
consensus that private arbitration does not constitute state action subject to
constitutional requirements).
81 See Walton, 298 F.3d at 478 (emphasizing that "courts can consider individual
claims of fraud or unconscionability in arbitration agreements as they would in any
other contract").
82 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 1208-11 (2006)
(clarifying that the separability rule is a matter of federal law and applying that rule
in finding that an arbitrator must decide claims that the contract was illegal, but
leaving it open for parties to bring judicial challenges of arbitration clauses in
contracts they claim never existed); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967) (applying "separability" to find courts may only consider
attacks on an arbitration clause and not those aimed at an underlying contract).
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dispositions and their current formalist application of key
83
defenses such as unconscionability.
1.

Lack of Consideration

Under common contract law, one may argue that an
arbitration provision is not supported by consideration. These
challenges usually fail, however, because it is sufficient if an
arbitration provision is mutual or is part of a larger exchange
(i.e. arbitration clause is one of many promises in a contract). In
Hawkins v. Aid Association for Lutherans,8 4 for example,
insurance policyholders argued that an arbitration clause added
to their insurance contracts after initial contracting was not
supported by consideration.8 5 The court quickly rejected their
argument, however, because the initial contracts stated that
policyholders would be bound by the insurance provider's
86
subsequent changes.
87
Similarly, in Marcinko v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc.,
consumers alleged that a separate arbitration provision a seller
provided to them after a sale was not supported by adequate
consideration.8 8
Although the court dismissed the lack of
consideration defense because the Marcinkos failed to assert it in
the lower court, the court also indicated that the defense lacked
merit because the sales contract incorporated the arbitration
89
provision.
The lack of consideration defense is therefore narrow, and
most courts strive to find consideration based on the underlying
transaction. 90 Only a minority of courts will find one-sided
provisions binding the weaker party lack consideration. 9 1

s3 See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability's Safety Net Function, 58
ALA. L. REV. 73 (2006) [hereinafter Schmitz, Unconscionability's Safety Net
Function].
84 338 F.3d 801 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1149 (2004).
85 Id. at 808.
86

Id.

87 No. 01CA677, 2002 WL 1438658, at *4
88

(Ohio Ct. App. June 21, 2002).

Id.

89 See id. at *2, *4.
90 See, e.g., id.

91 See Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 860, 862 (W. Va.
1998) (holding an arbitration provision in a consumer loan contract unconscionable
where such form provision allowed lender to seek foreclosure and collection actions

in court).
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Instead, courts find consideration based on other clauses in the
92
contract, thereby disempowering such challenges.
2.

Fraud and Misrepresentation

Fraud, or misrepresentation, is an additional contract
93
defense one may use to challenge an arbitration provision.
Courts will not hear a fraud challenge of an arbitration clause,
however, unless the alleged fraud is specifically directed to the
arbitration clause.9 4 One asserting fraud also bears the burden
of showing (1) a material representation; (2) that was false;
(3) the speaker knew was false or made recklessly without
knowing if it was true; (4) the speaker intended that the other
party rely on the representation; (5) the party acted in reliance
95
on the representation; and (6) the party thereby suffered injury.
In light of these stringent elements, consumers rarely
succeed on fraud challenges to arbitration provisions.
In
FirstMerit Bank, for example, consumers challenged an
arbitration addendum to a mobile home sales agreement based in
part on a claim that the sellers improperly failed to disclose or
explain the arbitration addendum. 96 They argued that the sellers
had a duty to explain the addendum because it required the
consumers to arbitrate all their claims but allowed the lender to
judicially foreclose and repossess the home.9 7 The court rejected
the fraud claim, however, concluding that the nondisclosure was
98
not an actual misrepresentation.
This conforms with courts' general agreement that there is
no duty to inform consumers about arbitration provisions. 99
92 See Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 342-43 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2001) (denying consumers' challenge of an arbitration provision in a financing
contract that allowed the lender to litigate collection and foreclosure suits and
emphasizing that courts almost uniformly reject such challenges).
93 See, e.g., In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 756 (Tex. 2001)
(discussing consumers' challenge of arbitration based on fraud, along with
unconscionability, duress, and revocation).
94 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co, 388 U.S. 395, 403-04
(1967) (holding that fraud in the inducement is not an arbitrability question for the
court unless it goes directly to the arbitration clause).
95 FirstMeritBank, 52 S.W.3d at 758.
96

Id.

97 Id.

Id.
See, e.g., Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862, 869-70
(D. Or. 2002) (emphasizing no duty to disclose or explain arm's length written
agreements).
98

99
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Furthermore, most courts decline to require a heightened
standard for a consumer's waiver of access to statutory judicial
remedies. 10 0
Accordingly, fraud claims against arbitration
provisions are generally futile.
3.

Unconscionability

The most commonly asserted ground for challenging
arbitration agreements is likely unconscionability. One claiming
unconscionability generally must show that an arbitration
provision is both substantively
and procedurally unconscionable. 10 1 Procedural unconscionability asks whether the
bargaining process was unduly one-sided, whereas substantive
unconscionability focuses on whether the terms of an arbitration
provision are oppressive or otherwise unfair. 10 2 At the same
time, courts have become formulaic in their applications of
unconscionability, which is threatening the doctrine's utility as a
safety net for catching overly burdensome arbitration

provisions. 103
Opponents of arbitration provisions nonetheless have had
some success on unconscionability challenges of pre-printed form
provisions offered without negotiation. 10 4 The adhesive nature of
these forms does not necessarily make them unconscionable, but
parties may prevail on a claim if they also satisfy the substantive
100 See, e.g., Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1372-73 (11th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2020 (2006) (following the majority of courts in
declining to apply a heightened "knowing and voluntary" standard to agreements to
arbitrate statutory claims). But see Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299,
1304 (9th Cir. 1994) (breaking from the majority of courts and requiring clear and
express agreement to arbitrate statutory claims).
101 See Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting
that most courts require both elements of unconscionability).
102 See id. at 265-66 (finding that a "take-it-or-leave-it" contract prepared by the
employer without negotiation by the employees was procedurally unconscionable);
Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1160 (2004) (finding one-year limitation on claims under arbitration
agreement in employment contract was substantively unconscionable because it
deprived employees of the benefit of the continuing violations doctrine available
under a state employment discrimination statute).
103 See Schmitz, Unconscionability'sSafety Net Function, supra note 83; see also
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability,and Equilibrium:The Return of
UnconscionabilityAnalysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO
ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 757, 812-13 (2004) (emphasizing slow and restrained
application of unconscionability in the wake of formalist intellectual and social
developments).
104 See Alexander, 341 F.3d at 265 (describing adhesion contracts).
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prong of the unconscionability defense by showing that an
arbitration agreement's terms are unduly oppressive or
unreasonable. 10 5 Example suspect terms include "carve-outs"
that give the drafter an option to litigate, cost and fee allocations
that overly burden one party, particularly-inconvenient location
10 6
selections, and remedy limitations that gut statutory claims.
In Harold Allen's Mobile Home Factory Outlet, Inc. v.
Butler,107 for example, a consumer argued that an arbitration
provision in a mobile home sales contract was unconscionable
108
because it gave the seller sole power to choose the arbitrator.
The court concluded that this provision was fundamentally
unfair because it did not even condition the arbitrator selection
on the consumer's consent. 10 9 The court narrowed the consumer's
remedy, however, by striking only the arbitrator selection
provision while still affirming the trial court's order to arbitrate
with a court-appointed arbitrator. 1 0
Success on unconscionability claims is nonetheless uncommon."' Growing formalism in United States contract law
and pro-arbitration jurisprudence have converged to limit the
viability of these claims. 1 2 Furthermore, once consumer-friendly
courts, such as the Alabama Supreme Court, have shifted views
since the late 1990s to now curtail unconscionability challenges
105 See Celeste M. Hammond, The (Pre) (As)summed "Consent" of Commercial
Binding Arbitration Contracts:An Empirical Study of Attitudes and Expectations of
TransactionalLawyers, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 589, 602-04 (2003) (discussing the
Supreme Court's strict two-prong unconscionability analysis).
106 See DRAHOZAL, supra note 72, at 113-14 (listing suspect terms and citing
cases supporting and denying these claims).
107 825 So. 2d 779 (Ala. 2002).
108 Id. at 782.
109 Id. at 783-85 (distinguishing selection provisions that condition arbitrator

selection on the other party's consent).
110 Id. at 785.
111 See, e.g., Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1077 (5th Cir.
2002) (denying unconscionability challenge to an arbitration agreement); Johnnie's
Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 790 So. 2d 956, 963-65 (Ala. 2001) (enforcing a consumer's duty
to arbitrate warranty, fraud, breach, and other claims even when the consumer was
unable to afford the arbitration costs and was illiterate and therefore unable to read
that there was an arbitration clause when he signed the contract ); Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Lewis, 813 So. 2d 820, 825 (Ala. 2001) (denying unconscionability challenge
to arbitration clause by illiterate consumer); Garcia v. Wayne Homes, LLC, No. 2001
CA 53, 2002 WL 628619, *12-13 (Ohio Ct. App. April 19, 2002) (denying
unconscionability challenge based on risk of prohibitive arbitration costs).
112 See Schmitz, Unconscionability's Safety Net Function, supra note 83
(explaining formalist trends squelching unconscionability's safety net function).
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of arbitration agreements. 113 In addition, some courts are quick
to raise the efficiency flag in limiting the application of
114
unconscionability claims to void form contracts.
To be fair, however, this does not mean consumers always
11 5
lose on unconscionability challenges of arbitration agreements.
Some commentators question whether courts' use of unconscionability to curb arbitration clauses runs afoul of the
preemptive power of the FAA.11 6 Even if this is true, however, it
117
confirms the need to regulate form arbitration provisions.
Moreover, the unconscionability doctrine is intended to provide a
safety net for courts to catch unfair contracting in cases that do
not fit the other defenses, such as lack of consideration and
fraud, that require more clear elements.1 18
This
makes
unconscionability the most viable means for challenging unfair
arbitration provisions in light of current FAA jurisprudence
relegating challenges to common contract law. The doctrine's
inherent flexibility also allows for consideration of contracting
culture.

113 See Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and JudicialDecision: A Case Study of
ArbitrationLaw in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 620 (2002) (analyzing Alabama
arbitration cases and concluding that "[u]nconscionability challenges to arbitration
agreements have fared poorly in the Supreme Court of Alabama since March 23,
1998, when business-funded justices gained a majority on the court"); see also
Melissa Briggs Hutchens, At What Costs?: When Consumers Cannot Afford the Costs
of Arbitration in Alabama, 53 ALA. L. REV. 599 at 608-10 (discussing Alabama cases
denying challenges based on high arbitration costs).
114 See M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 313-315
(Wash. 2000) (enforcing a consequential damages exclusion in a shrinkwrap license
for Bid Analysis software although a more flexible and contextual analysis may have
better promoted productivity).
115 See
Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration:
Unconscionability and Agreements to Arbitrate 2-4 (Berkely Elec. Press, Working
Paper No. 1375, 2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1375 (noting
consumer success on unconscionability claims).
116 See id. at 1-4, 55-57 (critiquing some courts' application of unconscionability
to arbitration agreements as evidencing "a new judicial hostility to arbitration in
noncommercial cases" that should be pre-empted by the FAA).
117 See
Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the
Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 186-89 (2004) (proposing
that some courts' "expansion of unconscionability to avoid arbitration" may suggest
that controls are needed).
11s See id. at 188-89 (noting that expanded application of unconscionability to
regulate arbitration may be reasonable due to "the malleability of the doctrine"); see
also Schmitz, Unconscionability's Safety Net Function, supra note 83 (proposing
flexible application of unconscionability in light of its philosophical and functional
underpinnings).
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III. THE CONTINUUM OF INTRA TO EXTRA COMMUNAL
CONTRACTING CULTURES

Differences in values and communication styles based on
ethnicity, heritage, and nationality are very important, especially
in international dispute resolution. 119 This Article, however,
proposes a broader conception of "contracting culture" in order to
highlight holes in current contract formalism and to remind
courts that a broad range of relational factors impact dispute
resolution agreements. What I term "contracting culture" goes
beyond the wealth of the parties, the economics of the commodity
120
at issue, or even the gender and ethnicity of the negotiators.
Instead, it refers to negotiators' competing or complimentary
relations, understandings, and values that influence their
perceptions and negotiations, and, in turn, the creation and
effects of dispute resolution provisions they incorporate in their
In addition, this Article analyzes contracting
contracts. 121
cultures on a continuum ranging from "intra communal" to "extra
communal" to the extent cultural factors converge, using
commercial construction as an example of a more intra
communal context and consumer contracting as an often more
extra communal culture.
A.

ContractingCulture's Role in Dispute Resolution

Arbitration developed within trade and merchant groups as
a means for participants in these groups to privately resolve
disputes in accordance with shared understandings and norms of
the community.1 22 Nonetheless, as Katherine Van Wezel Stone
has observed, fairness concerns about arbitration have grown as
119 See, e.g., Julie Ann Gold, ADR Through a Cultural Lens: How Cultural
Values Shape Our Disputing Processes, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 289, 289-93
(highlighting the impact of cultural assumptions and invisible differences based on
observations of disputing in Nepal versus America); Lee, supra note 10, at 1-28
(explaining apology in Korean dispute resolution); Rubin & Sander, supra note 10, at
250-53 (proposing heightened consideration of cultural differences relating to
ethnicity or nationality in dispute resolution).
120 See generally Kevin Avruch, Type I and Type H Errors in Culturally
Sensitive Conflict Resolution Practice, 20 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 351, 351-61 (2003)
(discussing various notions of "culture" and proposing "experience-distant" and
"experience-near" conceptions of the term).
121Id. at 354. Of course, the confines of a "contracting culture" depend on how
the context is defined. Construction culture, for example, may be different depending
on whether it includes public or international projects.
122 Van Wezel Stone, supra note 9, at 969-80.
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it has expanded into exchanges between "insiders" and
"outsiders" to self-regulating communities. 23
This Article
therefore seeks to remind courts of arbitration's communal
genesis. Moreover, it hopes to shed light on the importance of
considering contracting culture in policing the fairness of dispute
resolution provisions. 124 These provisions may be fair and
beneficial in more intra communal cultures, but problematic and
oppressive in more extra communal cultures.
1.

Communal Development of Private Dispute Resolution
Communities created arbitration systems designed to resolve
their communal conflicts in accordance with custom, equity and
internal "law."'125 They sought to use these systems to limit
disruption in trade, 12 6 and to avoid "the strict course and tedious
ceremonies of Law Suits." 27 Arbitration was "a matter of free
decision, each case being viewed in the light of practical
expediency and decided in accord with the ethical or economic
norms of some particular group."'128 It was considered less
adversarial than litigation, 129 and allowed for decisions in
accordance with custom and face-saving compromise. 130 In small
communities of several thousands, the courts rarely adjudicated
3
private disputes.' '
As civilizations grew and diversified, communities
throughout the world continued to employ arbitration as a means
for resolving internal matters. 132 By the thirteenth century,
Id. at 1035-36.
See id. This Article applauds Van Wezel Stone's proposal that courts should
more closely police arbitration in light of parties' shared or divergent
understandings within a community. It also builds on this analysis by broadening
the factors that contribute to where relationships may fall on a continuum of
contracting cultures.
123

124

125 JULIUS HENRY COHEN,

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAw 22-27

(1918).
126 Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83
U. PA. L. REV. 132, 144 (1934).
127 COHEN, supra note 125, at 117.
128 Wolaver, supra note 126, at 132.
129 See id.
130 WILL DURANT, OUR ORIENTAL HERITAGE 645-47, 795-97 (1954) (discussing
ancient roots of arbitration).
131See id. at 797.
132COHEN, supra note 125, at 25-38 (describing various forms of arbitrations in
in France, Scotland, Denmark, Ireland, Austria-Hungary, Persia, Japan, India,
Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden, and Portugal).
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community-based private dispute resolution systems gained
importance among merchant groups and guilds. 133 Merchant
guilds sought to govern their own affairs in accordance with
internal norms, standards, and rules and ensured compliance
with arbitration decisions with non-legal sanctions such as
134
expulsion.
By 1930, nearly every trade or profession in England
employed an arbitration system to foster maintenance and
135
regulation of commercial practices and trade success.
Commercial contracts within certain industries routinely
included arbitration clauses,1 3 6 and business communities
frowned on the common law courts' inadequate understanding of
commercial issues and application of industry norms and
standards. 137 Merchant communities embraced arbitration as
means for preserving communal peace and self-determination.
The New York Chamber of Commerce, established in 1768,
instituted an arbitration committee that continued to resolve
merchant disputes when the public courts were closed during the
American Revolutionary War and British occupation. 138 Industry
133 Id. at 71-72, 78.
134 See Wolaver, supra note 126, at 134-35; see also LUJO BRENTANO, ON THE
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF GILDS AND THE ORIGIN OF TRADE-UNIONS, at 33-39

(Burt Franklin 1969) (1870) (discussing how early guilds "had their origin in direct
imitation of the family" and assumed the family's role in protecting the community).
135 See Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial
ArbitrationAgreements in the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 238, 246 (1930).
136 SAMUEL ROSENBAUM, A REPORT ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND

13-14 (1916). A book of legal forms published in 1627 included a special section on
"Compromise and Arbitration," and another in 1655 contained a brew-house lease
that required the parties to submit disputes to a four member arbitration panel
composed of two from each of the party's companies. Id.
137 COHEN, supra note 125, at 71-72 (stating that before Lord Mansfield became
Chief Justice in England in 1756, courts treated mercantile questions "so ignorantly"
that merchants would privately resolve their disputes through arbitration).
138 See William Catron Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in
New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 208-09 (1956) (finding that the
Chamber's need for arbitration prompted a special meeting that produced a letter to
the British Commander requesting arbitration meetings to resolve mercantile
disputes during the revolutionary war). Arbitrations served as the only forum for
resolution of civil disputes during the British occupation and continued to thrive
after the revolution in both England and North America. Id. at 209-12; see also
ROSENBAUM, supra note 136, at 14-15. Even when the courts closed on September
11, 2001, due to the destruction in New York and Washington D.C., arbitrations
continued to proceed in offices of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA").
Interview with Lance Tanaka, Vice President, AAA, in Denver, Colo. (Sept. 12, 2001)
(notes on file with author).
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associations also used arbitration panels to efficiently end the
deluge of post-war disputes 139 and to protect their "way of doing
140
business" in the continually diversifying markets.
2.

Factors Contributing to Contracting Culture

"Culture" often refers to "refinements of a civilization," such
as art and literature.1 4 ' Broader conceptions of culture, however,
embrace factors such as relations, expectations and values of a
group that shape how players in the group negotiate and resolve
disputes. 142 This Article proposes that courts should consider
these factors in enforcing dispute resolution provisions and
procedures.
a.

Relations and Interdependencies

Arbitration and ADR agreements may foster "relational"
exchanges under Ian Macneil's relational contract theory. 143 This
is because relational contracts usually involve parties who
contract over time or share ties in a group. In real world
contracting, however, exchanges generally fall somewhere on a
murky spectrum between wholly relational and discrete,
depending on the degree of the parties' interconnections and
symbiotic reliance. For example, long-term supply contracts are
generally more relational than one-time purchases at a gas
44
station on the highway. 1
Similarly, those within a group or community may not all
contract on a regular basis, but they may at least share some
common connections. This may make their contracting culture

139 ROSENBAUM, supra note 136, at 14-15. After the war, the flood of fights

among cotton traders prompted the Liverpool Cotton Association to establish an
arbitration committee to handle international disputes. Id.
140 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 138, at 211-12 (depicting arbitration among
North American mercantile communities).
141 Gold, supra note 119, at 292.
142 See id. at 292-96, 302-17 (proposing a broader notion of culture and
explaining how it impacts modes of dispute resolution within a group).
143 See generally Macneil, Contracts, supra note 9, at 889-91, 895-97 (discussing
dispute resolution in relational contracts as means to retain status quo, create
harmony, and foster communications, and not to create great change or quickly fix
relationships); see also Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and
Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 877, 877-907 (2000) [hereinafter Macneil, Relational
Contract Theory] (clarifying and extending his work with relational contracts).
144 See Macneil, Relational Contract Theory, supra note 143, at 894-98
(discussing the spectrum nature of relational contracts).
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more intra communal to the extent that their common
relationships
prompt them to prefer community-based
understandings of justice focused on problem solving and
preserving connections in the community. 14 5 They may seek to
avoid "justice" focused on rule of law and getting retribution
against those who breach the law. 146 Instead, they are likely to
employ private dispute resolution systems that promote
147
restorative over retributive justice.
Furthermore, they may agree to exchanges with open terms
to allow for flexibility, expecting to cooperate to fill in and comply
with contract terms.1 48 Accordingly, they may agree to stepped
dispute resolution processes that require parties to mediate or
use other non-binding means to mutually resolve conflicts before
resorting to binding arbitration or litigation. 49 In this way,
parties rely on their relations and understandings of implicit
standards and norms instead of believing it necessary or efficient
to submit disputes directly to a third party for final deter50
mination.
Although these types of intra communal relations and
interdependencies are traditionally associated with native
communities that share ethnic or religious ties, they also may
exist within other groups.' 51 For example, the sports community
has developed the Court of Arbitration for Sport ("CAS"), in part,
to foster good relations and escape rigid legal remedies. 152 CAS
145 See John M. Ptacin et al., The Bethel Therapeutic Court: A Study of How
Therapeutic Courts Align with Yup'ik and Community Based Notions of Justice, 30
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 133, 133-39 (2005) (discussing use of community justice systems
and therapeutic courts to resolve disputes within Native communities in Alaska).
146 See id. (discussing fairness goals of native communities).
147 See id. (using and explaining these different notions of justice).
148 See Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract,8 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 149, 151-54 (2005) (discussing attributes of relational contracts and
applying them in employment contexts); Macneil, Relational Contract Theory, supra
note 143, at 878-83 (explaining relational contracts).
149 See infra Part III.B.1 (describing stepped processes employed by players in
commercial construction).
150 See id.; see also Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics
of Litigation and Arbitration:An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL
STUD. 549, 551-53, 558-60, 573-76 (2003) (finding in a study of franchise
agreements that arbitration provisions were less likely where the parties rely on
implicit terms but expect to ensure compliance with these terms and control
litigation through less formal means).
151 See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 9, at 969-79 (explaining the communal
development of arbitration within traditional and trade groups).
152 Richard H. McLaren, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Independent
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arbitrators exercise discretionary power to provide relief "where
an injustice is committed through a strict application of the
law." 153 This allowance for flexible remedies in arbitration has
also led the AAA to adopt rules that allow arbitrators to "grant
any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable
154
and within the scope of the agreement of the parties."
Common relational connections and peace preservation
interests also drive intra communal groups to favor the privacy of
arbitration and mediation. 155 Judicial trials threaten group
peace and prosperity by publicizing disputes and community
secrets, while private dispute resolution allows losing disputants
to "save face" and avoid negative publicity. Additionally, parties
may avoid ego preservation tactics thought to infect the formal
adversarial process of trial.156
b.

Understandingsand Expectations

Shared norms, understandings and expectations among
negotiators can greatly impact the deals they reach and the
dispute resolution systems they employ. This is why communitybased private dispute resolution systems gained importance
within trading communities. 157 Arbitration thrived because it
created means for communities to resolve their disputes in
accordance with shared understandings and norms that provided
Arena for World Sports Disputes, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 379, 381 (2001).
153 Id. at 404. McLaren nonetheless warns that the CAS is limited by "the
appropriate legal frame work." Id.; see also Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling Ass'n, 230
F.3d 1036, 1037-38 (7th Cir. 2000) (ordering USA Wrestling to certify Lindland as
its nominee for the Olympic Games in accordance with the re-wrestle ordered by an
arbitrator).
154 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
RULES R. 43 (AAA 2005), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440#R43. The Rule expressly allows the arbitrator
to order specific performance of a contract, to "make other decisions, including
interim, interlocutory, or partial rulings, orders, and awards," and to assess the fees,
expenses, and compensation. In addition, the award may include interest and/or
attorneys fees. Id.; see also Int'l Inst. for Conflict Prevention and Resolution,
RULES FOR NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION, R. 10.1-10.4 (2005), available at
http://www.cpradr.org/pdfs/arb-rules2005.pdf. (empowering arbitrators to "apply
such law(s) or rules of law as it determines to be appropriate" unless the parties
expressly mandate application of particular law in their arbitration agreement).
155 See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 124, 134-35 (1992)
(highlighting the secrecy of dispute resolution within the diamond industry).
156 See Baum, supranote 135, at 250.
157 See supra notes 134-154 and accompanying text (discussing rise of
arbitration among guilds and merchant groups).
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a basis for specialized, private "law". 158 Arbitrators were called
not to apply strict judicial law, but instead to allow merchants "to
get their questions settled in accordance with their instincts and
159
habits of thought."
Although arbitration has outgrown its historical roots in
many respects, 160 it continues to thrive in specialized industries
because it allows determinations based on field-specific norms
16 1
that often are not understood or applied in public courts.
These specialized industries are therefore more intra communal
to the extent they promote arbitrators' application of custom and
trade rules. This may be true, for example, with respect to CAS
and World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO")
arbitrations.162
In addition, the cotton industry may also be considered more
intra communal due to the importance of shared understandings
and standards in the cotton trade. Lisa Berstein found in her
study of the cotton industry that merchants within the trade
community prefer private dispute resolution because it allows for
flexible awards based on a Private Legal System ("PLS") made up
of industry created contract default rules traders generally
She found that arbitrators'
understand and respect.' 63
application of this PLS promotes efficiency and relationship
restoration. 164
Furthermore, arbitrators may grant partial
decisions and leave issues for parties' later agreement in order to
foster relationship restoration. 165 Community players' more intra
158 Over time, merchants developed their own "special law" based on trade
custom, norms, and standards. COHEN, supra note 125, at 73.
159 Id. at 3.
160 See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text (questioning haphazard
expansion of the scope and application of the FAA).
161 See McLaren, supra note 152, at 380-81 (highlighting the CAS arbitrators'
application of widely accepted principles that may some day be recognized as the "lex
sportiva").
162 See id.; see also Camille A. Laturno, InternationalArbitrationof the Creative:
A Look at the World Intellectual Property Organization's New Arbitration Rules,

9 TRANSNAT'L LAW 357, 369-71 (1996) (discussing the evolution of arbitration in

intellectual property disputes and emphasizing that arbitration is particularly
appropriate for resolution of such disputes because they involve specialized and
technical issues); Christine Lepera, What the Business Lawyer Needs To Know About
ADR: New Areas in ADR, 13 PLI/NY 709, 711-14, 719 (1998) (describing increased
use of arbitration to resolve disputes involving intellectual property rights, online
technology, and entertainment issues).
163 See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1725.
164 Id. at 1783.
165 Id. at 1784-85.
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communal culture fuels the industry's social and informational
infrastructures that foster successful reliance on non-legal
sanctions and private means for resolving disputes.166
Again, significant ethnic and religious differences often play
important roles in shaping negotiations and dispute resolution in
international trade. However, international trade negotiators
also may create more intra communal contracting cultures due to
their reliance on commonly understood and accepted principles of
international law, known as lex mercatoria.167 Although some
question the use of lex mercatoria, international parties may
prefer to contract out of national laws in some way and use
of these rules.16 8
arbitration to facilitate enforcement
Furthermore, they may share an interest in privately resolving
69
their disputes outside the politics of a nation's courts.
c.

Values and Needs RegardingDispute Resolution

Merchant communities first developed arbitration as means
for avoiding the courts and "resort to outside means for enforcing
awards."'170 They valued non-adversarial and private dispute
resolution, which saved them from the disruptions of the formal
court process. Community participants understood that the only
choice was to accept arbitrators' decisions or risk expulsion from
the community, and thus the market.' 7' Peer pressure and
166 See id. at 1785-88.
167 See COHEN, supra note 125, at 73 (noting that the first work on the Lex
Mercatoria,or Merchant Law, was published in 1622 as a customary law commonly
accepted among all nations); Judd Epstein, The Use of Comparative Law in
Commercial International Arbitration and Commercial Mediation, 75 TUL. L. REV.
871, 915-16 (2001) (discussing lex mercatoria);Kazuaki Sono, The Rise of Anational
Contract Law in the Age of Globalization, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1185, 1185-86 (2001)
(discussing the rise of delocalized contract law in international commercial
arbitration). But see Christopher R. Drahozal, ContractingOut of National Law: An
EmpiricalLook at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 524-26, 551
(2005) [hereinafter Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law] (explaining
understandings of lex mercatoria but finding empirical evidence of limited use of
such transnational commercial law in international commercial arbitration).
168 See Drahozal, ContractingOut of National Law, supra note 167, at 551-52.
169 Victor Perez Vargas & Daniel Perez Umana, The UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts in Costa Rican Arbitral Practice, 58 UNIF. L.
REV. 179, 179-98 (2006) (highlighting growth of arbitration in Costa Rica and
application of accepted international contract standards in both international and
domestic arbitration).
170DANIEL BLOOMFIELD, SELECTED ARTICLES ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 16
(1927).
171Id. (describing how merchants rarely sought judicial intervention due to non-
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concerns for reputation therefore drove many merchants to
comply with arbitration decisions without resort to public legal
172
sanctions.
In this way, contracting contexts may be more intra
communal in transactions in which the parties share values and
needs regarding dispute resolution. Parties may mutually wish
to avoid harm to their reputations that litigation could cause.
Furthermore, they may voluntarily accept private dispute
resolution provisions and abide by private determinations in
order to foster goodwill and avoid other non-legal sanctions.
For example, Professor Macaulay found in his study of
contracting between businesses within a commercial community
that "contract and contract law are often thought unnecessary"
due to power of non-legal sanctions against those who do not
honor commitments or produce good products. 173 Prior dealings,
personal relationships, and concern for maintaining good
business reputations may compel players within a business
community to comply with their contracts, or resolve disputes
without the aid of the courts. 174 This is because private dispute
resolution often solves far more problems than rigid litigation
and static contract law in such intra communal contracting
75
cultures.1
In addition, parties to more intra communal exchanges may
share other needs for avoiding litigation or other disruptive
dispute resolution processes.
Their mutual interests in
completing performance, especially in a long-term contract, may
outweigh inclinations to sue for immediate "justice" or
retribution.
For example, general contractors and subcontractors may mutually agree to resolve disputes privately, or
even delay discussions of disputes regarding such small changes
in performance, in order to complete a project on schedule and
avoid liability to the owner of the project.

legal sanctions).
172

Id.

173 Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations, supra note 9, at 63.
174 See id. at 63-64.
175 See Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, and Improving the
Navigation of the Yellow Submarine, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1161, 1169-70 (2006)

[hereinafter Macaulay, Contracts] (advancing "new legal realism" geared to move us
toward the "living law").
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B.

Examples to Consider on the ContractingCulture Continuum

1.

Commercial Construction Context

Repeated relations and common connections generally exist
in commercial construction contexts. This is why players in
these contexts often prefer arbitration and arbitrators' freedom to
For example, an
order remedies not available in court.176
arbitrator may direct a builder to complete construction of a
house 17 7 despite the judiciary's general refusal to order specific
performance of construction contracts. 178 Additionally, players
on commercial construction projects, including corporate owners,
contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, architects, engineers, and
construction managers, may share an interest in maintaining
good relations. This is especially true where they have had prior
dealings or hope to work with one another in the future.
Moreover, even contracting strangers within the industry may
179
hope to promote goodwill in order to generate future business.
This has contributed to the rise of binding arbitration as "the
Parties to
mainstay of construction dispute resolution."'' 8 0
construction contracts are likely to know one another on personal
and professional levels and share mutual connections. 8 1 This
176 See, e.g., David Co. v. Jim Miller Constr., Inc., 444 N.W.2d 836, 838, 840-41

(Minn. 1989) (affirming arbitrator's award ordering a builder to purchase defective
housing units from the owner, regardless of whether relief would not have been
appropriate in court).
177See Bradigan v. Bishop Homes, Inc., 20 A.D.2d 966, 966, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1018,
1019 (4th Dep't 1964).
178 See Or. Ry. Co. v. Or. Ry. & Nav. Co., 37 F. 733, 734 (C.C.D. Or. 1885) ("As a

general rule a contract to build or repair will not be specifically enforced by a court
of equity."); Cartwright v. Or. Elec. Ry. Co., 171 P. 1055, 1056 (Or. 1918)
(emphasizing the settled, general rule denying specific performance of contracts for

building and construction and contracts to make repairs); cf. Dixon v. City of
Monticello,

585 N.E.2d

609,

619-20

(Ill. App.

Ct.

1992) (ordering specific

performance of a home sales contract and reimbursement from purchaser for
interest accrued to the date of closing).
179 See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law:
Reality and Reform in a Transactional System, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 463 (1998)
[hereinafter Stipanowich, Reconstructing ConstructionLaw] (explaining realities of
commercial construction projects).
180 Id. at 565 (predicting that "binding arbitration, long the mainstay of

construction dispute resolution, will probably remain the preferred alternative to
litigation").
181 See

id. at 465-70, 505 (highlighting prevalence

of arbitration in the

construction industry); see also James P. Moore & Robert A. Shearer, Expanding
Partnering'sHorizons: The Challenge of Partneringin the Middle East, 59 DISPUTE
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creates a more friendly and accountable contracting culture in
which players feel an inherent duty to abide by their promises
and treat one another fairly. These players have therefore
preferred to resolve disputes through binding arbitration, even
when courts generally refused to enforce arbitration agreements
82
under ouster and revocability doctrines.
In addition, construction industry arbitrators generally have
technical expertise in construction or construction law.18 3 They
also are usually familiar with the prevailing form construction
contracts, and their provisions for a combination of ADR and
arbitration. 8 4 The AIA 1997 A201 General Conditions of the
Contract for Construction ("AIA Conditions") used on many
construction projects require such a stepped dispute resolution
process.1 8 5 These steps require parties to first submit claims to
the project architect for initial determination within 21 days
after they "first recognized the condition giving rise to the
[c]laim."'18 6 After the earlier of the architect's decision or 30 days
after a claim is first submitted, the parties then must seek to
resolve their disputes through mediation conducted under the
AAA Construction Industry Mediation Rules. 8 7 If mediation
RESOL. J. 54, 56 (Nov. 2004-Jan. 2005) (discussing the construction industry's long
use of private means to resolve disputes); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Beyond

Arbitration: Innovation and Evolution in the United States Construction Industry,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 65, 139 (1996)

(also discussing the ADR norm in

construction contexts).
182 See Hetrick v. Friedman, 602 N.W.2d 603, 609-10 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999);

Jones, supra note 138, at 212-15 (explaining how parties to construction contracts
voluntarily submitted to arbitration of future disputes under form pre-dispute
arbitration agreements, even when courts refused to specifically enforce these
executory agreements).
183 See Jones, supra note 138, at 212-13 (explaining prevalence of construction
arbitrations conducted between 1800 and 1920, primarily because those in the
industry desired to have disputes decided by a technician in the field).
184 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Of "ProceduralArbitrability" The Effect of
Noncompliance with Contract Claims Procedures, 40 S.C. L. REV. 847, 847-50 (1989)
(discussing arbitration under the standard AIA contract provisions and its
acceptance in the construction industry for many years); Thomas J. Stipanowich,
The Multi-Door Contract and Other Possibilities, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
303, 375 (1998).
185 AIA, AL4 Document A201-General Conditions for the Contract for
Construction (1997), in 2 JAMES ACRET, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY FORMBOOK 12-54
to 12-56, 12-74 to 12-77 (3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter ALA Conditions] (using AIA as
typical construction form contract and reprinting the dispute resolution provisions in
the form).
186 Id. at 12-74.
187

See id. at 12-76. The contract further specifies that mediation must "proceed
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fails, then the parties must arbitrate any remaining claims in
accordance with the AAA Construction Industry Arbitration
18 8
Rules.
Moreover, the AIA Conditions may promote global
settlement by permitting consolidated arbitration. They allow
for proceedings that include the owner, contractor, separate
contractors with a stake in the project, and any other contracting
parties "substantially involved in a common question of fact or
law whose presence is required if complete relief is to be accorded
in arbitration."1 8 9 Some critique the Conditions, however, for
failing to clearly require multi-party arbitration including
architects, engineers, subcontractors, insurers, sureties, and
others who may bear responsibility or liability for claims.1 90
They question the Conditions' protection of the architect from
joinder in arbitration without the architect's express consent.
This may nonetheless be reasonable because project architects
are usually key witnesses who should remain neutral in
assessing and reporting what happened on a project.
The AIA conditions are representative in the industry. A
typical standard form construction contract promulgated by the
Associated General Contractors of America ("AGC Short Form"),
also used on many construction projects, similarly allows for
private dispute resolution of any claims related to a project.1 91
in advance of arbitration or legal or equitable proceedings, which shall be stayed
pending mediation for a period of 60 days from the date of filing, unless stayed for a
longer period by agreement of the parties or court order." Id. It is unclear, however,
whether and how a court will give effect to such agreements to mediate. See
Schmitz, Refreshing Contractual Analysis, supra note 2, at 1-4 (discussing
ambiguity of judicial enforcement of agreements to mediate).
188 See AIA Conditions,supra note 185, at 12-76; see also Interview by Matthew
Peters, Research Assistant to Amy J. Schmitz, with Lance Tanaka, Vice President,
AAA, in Denver, Colo. (July 13, 2006) (notes on file with author) (stating that
construction contracts routinely require private dispute resolution and that most
include mediation clauses as a precursor to arbitration, but noting a movement to
allow for litigation instead of arbitration due to judicialization of arbitration).
189 A14 Conditions,supra note 185, at 12-77.
190 See Thomas E. McCurnin, Two-PartyArbitrations in a Multiple-Party World,
26 CONSTR. LAw. 5, 5 (2006) (critiquing lack of clear joinder and consolidation rules
and recognizing the need for multiple-party dispute resolution in construction
disputes).
191 Associated General Contractors of America ("AGC"), Document No. 205
Standard Short Form Agreement Between Owner and Contractor (Where the
Contract Price Is a Lump Sum) (2000), in ACRET, supra note 185, at 13-61 (using the
AGC contract for lump sum as a typical construction form contract and reprinting
the dispute resolution provisions in that contract).
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The AGC Short Form requires a contractor to give the owner
notice of a claim within 14 days after occurrence of a condition
giving rise to the claim, but allows exceptions for claims related
192
to increases in contract price or time or in case of "emergency."
It also requires that parties seek to settle disputes relating to the
contract "first through direct discussions," and if that fails,
through mediation under the AAA Construction Industry
Mediation Rules. 193 The AGC Short Form then differs from the
AIA Conditions by allowing parties to choose between two
provisions for finally determining remaining claims, one
requiring binding arbitration under the AAA Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules and the other allowing parties to
assert remaining claims in litigation. 194 The form also allows the
"prevailing party" in a binding proceeding to recover reasonable
attorney fees, costs, and expenses incurred in connection with the
1 95
proceeding.
Private dispute resolution also has become a norm in
international construction contracting. Players on international
construction projects value ADR regardless of ethnic and
religious diversity because they often share concerns regarding
tight project timelines and budgets, and seek to preserve their
96
reputations and relationships in the construction industry.
This is why an ADR technique known as "partnering' has been
successful on international projects, including projects in the
Middle East where stakeholders are faced with especially volatile
cultural and political differences. 197 Partnering provisions have
been gaining popularity because they call various stakeholders
and players on a project to attend a pre-construction workshop
facilitated by an ADR professional who aids participants in
identifying common goals and critical issues and setting agendas
192 Id. (stating that a contractor should give an owner notice before proceeding
with extra work "[e]xcept in an emergency").
193

Id.

194 Id.

The form sets out a paragraph for arbitration and one for litigation, and
the contracting parties must check a box indicating which paragraph in the form
they choose to follow.
195 Id. Presumably, this cost shifting provision is designed to encourage parties
to resolve disputes voluntarily through discussions or mediation, in that the
provision only applies with respect to costs of any binding dispute resolution process.
196 See Moore & Shearer, supra note 181, at 56-58 (noting common understandings and goals of players on international projects and explaining how these
bonds may transcend ethnic or religious differences).
197 See id. at 55-59 (discussing values of partnering on Middle East projects).
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for how they will privately resolve disputes that may arise during
performance. 198 This promotes trust, open communication, and
team-building skills that foster dispute prevention. 199
Accordingly, commercial construction contexts sit at the
intra communal end of the contracting culture continuum. These
contexts are more relational in that they involve intra communal
parties who are continually building relationships on their
projects and common connections in the industry. Furthermore,
these parties generally understand and accept industry norms,
standards, and rules not only with respect to construction, but
also about dispute resolution.
They generally condone the
accepted construction contract forms and the forms' private
dispute resolution provisions, as well as other non-legal sanctions
aimed to ensure performance. 20 0 In addition, parties' needs to
complete a project on time and on budget also foster amicable
and private dispute resolution in lieu of litigation. Indeed, this
has prompted the industry to move toward partnering and other
20 1
more flexible dispute prevention processes.
Nonetheless, the placement of an exchange relationship on
the contracting culture continuum will depend on particularities
of the context. For example, construction contracts between
residential consumers and contractors may be extra communal
when consumers have no say in form arbitration clauses and no
prior experience with construction or private dispute
resolution. 20 2 Moreover, the depth and texture of ethnic and
political differences may impact the communal nature of
198 Id.
at 56; Stipanowich, Reconstructing ConstructionLaw, supra note 179, at
501 (discussing emergence of partnering, especially on international construction
projects).
199 See Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law, supra note 179, at
501-02 (highlighting the trend toward facilitated conflict management in the
construction industry and the promotion of strategies such as partnering aimed to
prevent disputes).
200 See supra notes 185-188 and accompanying text (explaining use of stepped
processes in more intra communal contexts).
201 See Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law, supra note 179, at 50002 (emphasizing growth of mediation and other stepped techniques for preventing
conflict); Interview by Matthew Peters, supra note 188 (noting growth of mediation
in construction disputes and the AAA's recent move to revise its form contracts to

allow parties to choose arbitration or litigation if mediation fails).
202 See Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law, supra note 179, at 503-

05 (noting how residential construction contracting is very different from commercial
contracting, and that homeowners may be at a disadvantage in negotiations due to
lack of industry understandings or technical expertise).
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international projects, and political pressures may affect the
culture of public construction exchanges. This Article, therefore,
is merely a first step in a larger exploration of the fairness of
private dispute resolution provisions in different contracting
203
cultures.
2.

Consumer Contracting
Professor Jean Sternlight has noted that mandatory
20 4
consumer arbitration is a "uniquely U.S. phenomenon."
Policies in the European Union and elsewhere may allow for
voluntary consumer arbitration, but they generally bar
companies' use of mandatory pre-dispute form arbitration clauses
that preclude consumers' access to litigation. 20 5
Despite
proposals for reform in the United States, American law has not
followed other nations in limiting consumer arbitration and
requiring public access to arbitration determinations affecting
206
consumers.
Consumer contexts, however, raise real concerns regarding
possible misuse of private arbitration systems due to consumers'
20 7
bargaining disadvantages with corporate sellers and lenders.
Furthermore, consumer contracting cultures may be more extra
communal when consumers do not share relations and
connections in an industry or with arbitration providers that
corporations may befriend as repeat players who routinely
arbitrate. These repeat player corporations are often insiders
that choose the arbitration providers and draft arbitration
203 I currently am beginning a qualitative empirical study of contracting and
dispute resolution on a construction project, and I plan to expand and enrich that
research with a quantitative study. I also am doing the same with respect to
contracting and dispute resolution in the consumer culture. Such empirical study is
necessary to understand contracting in the real world. See also Macaulay, Contracts,
supra note 175, at 1165-72, 1188-90 (highlighting need for research and
understanding of the 'living law" and the importance of recognizing the workings of
the real world).
204 See Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration,supra note 3, at 138.
205 Id. at 139-40; see also Christopher R. Drahozal, New Experiences of

InternationalArbitration in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 251-53 (2006)
(noting the FAA's coverage of e-contracts and how the United States differs from
most other countries in enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer
electronic contracts).
206 See Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration,supra note 3, at 139-40.
207 Concerns regarding one-sided arbitration agreements arose at common
law. See IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 68-71 (1992).
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contract terms that suit their needs. Meanwhile, "little-guy"
individuals are generally outsiders to the extent they lack
understanding or control of these terms.
Little-guy consumers may therefore become subject to form
arbitration provisions on a take-it-or-leave-it basis without
understanding or experience with arbitration. 20
These
arbitration provisions become "mandatory" to the extent consumers rarely read or understand them or have real opportunity
or inclination to find competitor companies who do not impose
similar provisions. 20 9 In addition, consumers generally lack
resources to research and use these mandatory arbitration
schemes. 2 10
Individuals' preference for inaction and under
estimation of litigation risks also prevent them from taking
2 11
action to abolish or seek revisions of form arbitration clauses.
Insiders' imposition of form arbitration provisions is
powerful.
Corporate parties draft form provisions that are
subject to little or no public or legal oversight. Defenders of this
208 See Jean R. Sternlight, Panaceaor Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 637-38 (1996)
(critiquing companies' inclusion of arbitration clauses in their contracts with
consumers, employees, and other "little guys"); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole,
Uniform Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 759, 765-67 (2001) [hereinafter Cole, Uniform Arbitration] (critiquing
rampant use of form arbitration provisions in employment contracts); Geraldine
Szott Moohr, Opting in or Opting out: The New Legal Process or Arbitration,
77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1087, 1092-94 (1999) (discussing unfairness of arbitration in
traditionally non-merchant contexts); Stempel, Bootstrapping, supra note 45, at
1410-12 (critiquing industries' rampant inclusion of arbitration provisions in form
contracts in markets such as securities in which individuals have no meaningful
alternatives to these forms); Schmitz, Mobile-Home Mania, supra note 5, at 313-22
(discussing manufacturers' use and misuse of form arbitration agreements in
purchase and finance agreements with consumers).
209 See Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, supra note 3, at 140-41 (discussing
the debate regarding the characterization of arbitration as "mandatory" and
explaining why the characterization is appropriate).
210 Sarah
Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and
Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 452-54 (1996) (critiquing form arbitration clauses
in employment contracts); Cole, Uniform Arbitration, supra note 208, at 768-69
(extending her discussion of arbitration in employment contexts); Stempel,
Bootstrapping,supra note 45, at 1407-08, 1410-12, 1420-21 (critiquing impositions
of form arbitration provisions where individuals have no real opportunity to
negotiate or avoid these provisions).
211 See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text (explaining Korobkin's
"inertia theory"); Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration,supra note 3, at 141 (noting how
consumers may not be as "rational" as economic theory assumes and that they
"predictably underestimate the risk of having to sue the company").
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norm argue that this provides consumers with faster and less
expensive means for asserting claims than they would obtain
through litigation and fosters economic efficiency that results in
lower prices for the public. 2 12 Critics of consumer arbitration
respond that it is unfair based on its non-consensual nature as
well as biases that favor the repeat-players that draft form
213
provisions and routinely use these arbitration systems.
Repeat-players' form provisions may augment consumers'
bargaining disadvantages by impairing consumers' legal rights
and remedies.
These players often have different dispute
resolution values and needs than consumers, and power to select
arbitrators with incentives to skew procedures to favor these
repeat clients. 21 4
Companies may also draft arbitration
provisions to preclude class relief, shorten time limitations on
asserting claims, bar recovery of punitive damages and attorney
fees, and limit access to injunctive relief.2 15 Blanket arbitration
of consumers' claims also may stymie development of consumer
law and prevent the public from learning about companies'
21 6
statutory violations.
Of course, these concerns do not prove true in all consumer
cases, and there are legitimate defenses of consumer arbitration.
Many consumers would prefer to pay lower prices than to retain
21 7
access to the courts to resolve any eventual disputes.
Furthermore, some complain that consumers often abuse class
relief in court and that arbitration saves tax dollars by

212 See Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration,supra note 3, at 148-51 (summarizing
defenses of consumer arbitration).
213 See id. at 141-48 (explaining criticisms of consumer arbitration).
214 This is what some have called the "repeat provider" bias, although providers
defend that they have no direct influence over arbitrators and strive to be neutral.
See Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration,supra note 3, at 144-45.
215 See id. at 146-47.
216 See id. at 141-48 (discussing the individual and public interest criticisms of
mandatory arbitration).
217 See Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration
Agreements-with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees,
5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 254-64, 292 (2006) (emphasizing the overall cost savings of predispute arbitration clauses for companies and consumers and critiquing cost
analysis that fails to consider these savings in assessing costs of pursuing
arbitration claims); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional
Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen),
29 McGEORGE L. REv. 195, 210-15 (1998) (explaining how arbitration clauses
benefit consumers and the purchasing public).
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preventing consumers from clogging the courts with frivolous
claims.
Indeed, the debate regarding consumer arbitration has raged
2 18
for years; therefore, I will not recount its intricacies here.
Suffice it to say that the American consumer arbitration
phenomenon is controversial. Moreover, the expansion of form
arbitration provisions in consumer contracts means that
arbitration provisions now bind individuals whose relations,
understandings, and values regarding dispute resolution compete
with those of the corporations that draft and control these
arbitration forms. 219 This raises significant questions worthy of
study regarding the fairness and legitimacy of form arbitration
220
provisions in such extra communal contracting cultures.
IV. CONSIDERING CONTRACTING CULTURE IN APPLYING
UNCONSCIONABILITY TO POLICE ARBITRATION PROVISIONS AND
PROCEDURES

As explained above, United States courts' interpretations of
the New York Convention and FAA have left general contract
defenses as the most viable tools for challenging arbitration
provisions.
In addition, courts' efficiency-focused consent
assumptions and formulaic applications of contract defenses have
further limited challengers' options for seeking relief from
burdensome arbitration provisions. 22 1 The unconscionability
doctrine, however, retains an equitable core that makes it a
viable tool for acknowledging contracting culture in policing
fairness of arbitration forms. This Article, therefore, invites
courts to apply this doctrine with clear consideration of
contracting culture and an exchange's intra or extra communal
218

This summary was meant only to give a taste of the arguments, as they have

been hashed out in books and articles too numerous to cite. For a synopsis of
arguments and studies, see generally Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, supra note
3, at 127-84.
219 See, e.g., Washington Mut. Fin. Group v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 265-66 (5th
Cir. 2004) (holding illiterate plaintiffs to an arbitration clause in loan and insurance
terms they did not read or understand).
220 Again, I am in the early stages of an empirical study of consumer contracting
and dispute resolution. See supra note 203 (noting my research in the construction
culture); see also Macaulay, Contracts, supranote 175, at 1190-93 (highlighting the
need to ask about the effectiveness of form contracts and problems in communicating
default provisions).
221 See supra Part II (discussing limitations on challenges of arbitration
clauses).
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character. In this way, the Article seeks to revive contextual
consideration of form arbitration provisions and to highlight that
economic and resource imbalances do not necessarily make
arbitration provisions legally unconscionable.
Courts should
resist the popular push to avoid deep contract review and to base
222
determinations on status assumptions.
A.

Acknowledging ContractingCulture in Assessing Procedural
Unconscionability

As explained above, procedural unconscionability focuses on
the bargaining relations between contracting parties and asks
whether a contract was overly adhesive. In the arbitration
context, courts may find procedural unconscionability when a
contracting party must accept a form arbitration provision on a
223
take-it-or-leave-it basis without explanations or negotiation.
Courts must be careful, however, to consider contracting culture
in order to avoid assuming that economic and resource
imbalances necessarily lead to one-sided bargaining.
Arbitration provisions in intra communal contracting
cultures are unlikely to be procedurally unconscionable. Instead,
it is generally efficient and fair to enforce even form arbitration
terms in these contexts when players understand and respect the
terms, and private dispute resolution can provide better means
than litigation for solving the parties' disputes. 224 Players in
commercial construction contracting, for example, generally
expect to resolve disputes under the form dispute resolution
provisions of the AIA or AGC contracts and the AAA
Construction Industry Mediation and Arbitration Rules these
contracts prescribe. Furthermore, even if players have not read
or researched these provisions, they nonetheless understand and
225
value the use of private processes to resolve project disputes.

222 This proposed analysis invites acknowledgement of the true workings of the
world. See Macaulay, Contracts, supra note 175, at 1193-94 (concluding that new

legal realism may not help create unified, clear, and simple contract theories, but
such realism is necessary to prevent inaccuracy that could lead us into "undersea
mountains").
223 See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing unconscionability).
224 See supra Part II.A (explaining how modern contract theory supports form
contracting).
225 See supra Part III.B.1 (depicting the typical contracting culture on
construction projects).
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In addition, courts should recognize and enforce provisions
that foster voluntary dispute resolution through their stepped
processes. 226 Form construction contracts, for example, generally
preclude a claimant from submitting claims for a binding
arbitration decision or judgment until after the claimant has
sought negotiations and/or mediation.
Indeed, construction
players have led the way in crafting and pursuing dispute
22 7
prevention mechanisms, such as partnering.
Moreover, it generally is fair to enforce these arbitration
provisions in such intra communal cultures even where the
parties are not necessarily economic equals. For example, a
small subcontractor hired by a large general contractor to install
drywall may not have an army of lawyers to analyze and
negotiate contract provisions, let alone settle disputes. 228 The
subcontractor may have adequate power to protect itself,
however, due to shared reputation interests with the general
contractor and the general contractor's reliance on the
subcontractor to complete its work. A building needs drywall,
and the general contractor will become liable to the owner and
others for damages due to delay if it has to find a replacement
drywall subcontractor in the midst of a project. A general
contractor also wants to protect its reputation among
subcontractors and save the costs of paying a replacement a
premium for lack of lead-time and expedited work.
Consequently, mutual needs and interests often foster
balanced and cooperative contracting orientations that may
prevent intra communal players from taking advantage of
economic or resource disparities. 229 In addition, detailed form
contracts in these cooperative contexts are often reasonable and
efficient. Researchers found in a study of simulated purchasing
226 See supra notes

185-188

and accompanying

text (explaining stepped

provisions).
227 See supra notes 197-199 and accompanying text (explaining partnering).
228 See Crain Const. Co. v. Dinatale, No. A-0764-03T1, 2004 WL 3250387, at *3
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 3, 2003) (summarily rejecting subcontractor's claim
that arbitration clause was unconscionable). I also use this example based on my
experiences as a construction lawyer in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Seattle,
Washington.
229 See Thomas S. Atkin & Lloyd M. Rinehart, The Effect of Negotiation
Practices on the Relationship Between Suppliers and Customers, 22 NEGOTIATION J.
47, 49-52 (2006) (reporting findings from empirical study of how negotiation
practices affect resulting contracts and business relationships and concluding that
negotiators with cooperative orientations often avoid coercive tactics).
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negotiations, for example, that despite their hypothesis that
negotiators' cooperative orientations would lead to less contract
formality, cooperativeness actually led to greater contract
formality. 230 This may help explain why the AIA Conditions
23 1
discussed above are quite long, complicated, and formal.
This also suggests that formulaic arbitration provisions and
rules may be beneficial in intra communal contracting cultures.
Complicated form contracts are not necessarily means for
legislating power differentials. 232 Furthermore, it seems that the
more intra communal a culture is, the more likely it is that
negotiators within that culture will have cooperative attitudes.
Mutual dispute resolution values and needs in more intra
communal contracting cultures may counteract uneven economic
resources and lead to reasonable arbitration provisions.233
Courts should, therefore, continue to enforce form
arbitration provisions in intra communal cultures like those in
commercial construction contexts. The degree of deference owed
to an arbitration provision in a particular exchange, however,
should depend on the extent of cooperativeness and mutual
understanding in that exchange. 234 Courts should consider
dynamics of personal relationships among the negotiators and be
careful in labeling and defining cooperative contracting
cultures .235
This also means that courts should be particularly vigilant in
assessing the procedural unconscionability of form arbitration
provisions in extra communal contracting cultures. Consumers
often do not share relationships, connections, or understandings
with corporate sellers and lenders. Furthermore, consumers' and
Id. at 47, 52-54, 61.
See supra notes 185-190 and accompanying text (discussing and citing AIA
contract terms).
232 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 183-202 and accompanying text (discussing provisions in
construction contracts); see also Drahozal, "Unfair"Arbitration Clauses, supra note
44, at 720-22, 721 n.195, 741 (providing empirical evidence that form arbitration
clauses in franchise agreements between franchisors and franchisees are generally
fair despite power and resource differentials and that those with less power may
even benefit from "unfair" arbitration provisions due to efficiency benefits of such
provisions).
234 See Atkin & Rhinehart, supra note 229, at 59-61 (finding that "personal
characteristics and negotiation practices" impact satisfaction with contracting and
the establishment of long-term relationships).
235 See id. at 60 (highlighting "the importance of determining who the most
appropriate lead negotiator should be in any given negotiation").
230
231
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For
corporations' dispute resolution values may compete.
example, consumers often value class relief because it allows
them to save costs by asserting small dollar claims as a group.
Corporations, however, often use arbitration clauses to preclude
class actions as means for chilling these consumer claims and
236
keeping them private.
These players also often have disparate bargaining power
that companies with power use to foster their values and needs to
the disadvantage of consumers with little arbitration resources or
experience. 237 Corporations may offer these form provisions to
consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it-basis at a time when the
consumers do not realize the significance of these provisions.
Furthermore, repeat-player corporations usually draft these form
provisions knowing that consumers generally do not read or
understand these provisions. Consumers also usually lack the
power contractually to protect themselves from arbitration
procedures that these players prescribe.
Accordingly, some courts appropriately recognize that this
uneven bargaining in consumer arbitration contexts may lead to
Courts should be careful,
procedural unconscionability. 238
however, not to jump to conclusions in assuming that resource
imbalances necessarily lead to procedural unfairness. Again, a
subcontractor with limited resources may not be subject to
unconscionable disadvantages with respect to arbitration
provisions. 2 39 This helps to explain why subcontractors often are
240
proponents of arbitration.
236 See Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, supra note 3, at 144-47 (discussing
corporate use of arbitration to limit consumer and employee remedies).
testing these assumptions through empirical studies of
237 1 am currently
construction and consumer contracting. Also, note that my study of construction

contracting is different from the Atkin and Rinehart study in that I am doing a
qualitative examination of players' experiences on a construction project instead of
volunteers' experiences during simulated negotiations. See Atkin & Rinehart, supra
note 229, at 58-59 (reporting findings from purchasing-negotiation simulations with
students in a classroom).
238 See, e.g., Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 696 N.W.2d 214, 220 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2005) (finding consumer loan agreement procedurally unconscionable based on
specific findings that Wisconsin Auto offered the loan terms "in a take it or leave it
manner," and that "Jones was in a desperate situation").
239 See supra text accompanying note 228 (discussing how resource imbalances
may not disrupt the intra communal character of construction contracting in many
cases).
240 See Albert M. Higley Co. v. N/S Corp., 445 F.3d 861, 862-63 (6th Cir. 2006)
(discussing a subcontractor seeking to compel arbitration against the larger general
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Moreover, even in seemingly extra communal consumer
cases, courts should not jump to procedural unconscionability
conclusions without considering contracting culture. In Porpora
v. Gatliff Building Co., 241 for example, the court quickly
concluded that the arbitration provision in the contract between
a family-owned building company and an owner of a $297,000
home was procedurally unconscionable because the builder
included the clause in all of its contracts and did not explain
arbitration to the homeowners. 242 The court failed to consider
that the parties did not necessarily have uneven bargaining
power or resources. It also failed to recognize that the owner
could have inquired about the clause or contracted with another
builder. Moreover, arbitration may have been the best avenue
for the parties to resolve their disputes quickly and possibly
preserve the parties' relations.
Home contracting is not easily categorized as intra or extra
communal. Instead, residential construction exchanges fall in
varying places on the intra to extra communal continuum,
depending on the particularities of the exchange at issue. Large
corporate builders may take advantage of bargaining imbalances
in some cases, but homeowners often have adequate power and
Consumers
resources to protect themselves in other cases.
looking to build a home usually have many contractor options,
and contractors compete for business and goodwill. This suggests
that courts should not assume heavy-handed contracting in
residential cases. Earnest courts should be careful to consider
the relations, experiences, understandings, and options of parties
involved.
Monitoring How ContractingCulture Affects Substantive
Unconscionability
Substantive unconscionability calls courts to consider
whether the particular terms of an arbitration provision are
unduly harsh or oppressive in practice. Revived formalism in
contract law, however, has prompted many United States courts
to avoid any substantive fairness analysis and to assume the
fairness or unfairness of arbitration terms without truly
B.

contractor).
241 828 N.E.2d 1081 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
242

Id. at 1084-86.
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considering how these terms apply in context. 243 This Article
seeks to break that trend by emphasizing the importance of
carefully considering how contracting culture affects the practical
application of arbitration provisions and procedures. Identical
terms can have very different impacts in various contexts.
As is true with respect to procedural unconscionability, form
arbitration terms are often substantively fair in intra communal
contexts. This is because intra communal parties with mutual
understandings and dispute resolution values are likely to use
form terms that are reasonable in their contexts. For example,
players on a commercial construction project often incorporate
AIA dispute resolution provisions that prescribe a stepped
process requiring mediation as a precursor to binding arbitration
as a last resort. 244 The intra communal culture lends toward
such collaborative dispute resolution because the players
understand that expensive or adversarial claims procedures
could delay or derail the project. 245 The AIA stepped process
provides parties with opportunities to resolve their disputes
privately without halting performance or damaging reputations
and relations in the industry.
In addition, arbitration terms barring class relief usually
have little import in commercial construction disputes because
these disputes generally do not involve many claimants with
similar claims. Meanwhile, ALA and other forms often allow for
some consolidation, although they could more clearly allow for
required joinder of all those on the project with a stake in a
dispute. 246 Players on a construction project may agree to
consolidate all claims in one arbitration proceeding as means for
For example, a
fosteringing global resolution of disputes.
construction project may involve various separate contracts
among the owner, the contractor, subcontractors, and engineers,
with only some of the contracts even including arbitration
243 See Schmitz, Unconscionability's Safety Net Function, supra note 83
(discussing how courts have strictly limited consideration of substantive fairness,
usually opting to assume terms are sufficiently fair); see also supra note 106 and
accompanying text (listing terms courts have considered suspect).
244 See supra notes 183-195 and accompanying text (discussing ALA and AGC
form contracts).
245 See supra notes 176-204 and accompanying text (discussing construction
culture).
246 See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing allowance for some
joinder, but need for more clarification in AIA forms).
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clauses.
Despite the players' options to require separate
proceedings, however, they may choose to join in one proceeding
in order to pool their defense resources and avoid being
scapegoats for each other. Furthermore, consolidation prevents
the inefficiencies and preclusion problems caused by multiple
awards or judgments on the same facts and issues.
In contrast, form arbitration procedures precluding class
relief may unfairly chill injureds' claims in extra communal
contexts in which parties do not share norms and
understandings, let alone access to resources. 247 Such forms may
be substantively unconscionable because they provide one-sided
roadmaps for vindicating claims and may dissuade consumers
from asserting small dollar warranty claims. 248 Furthermore,
consumer class actions may be important in curbing and
shedding light on warranty and other legal violations by
corporations. It therefore may be proper for the court to refuse to
enforce class action waivers or to reform such arbitration
249
provisions to allow class arbitration.
In Hill, for example, the Hills sought to assert their
warranty claims with other similarly situated consumers due to
the small dollar amount of their individual claim and their lack
25 0
of individual resources to pay arbitration and attorney costs.
There were other consumers with warranty claims similar to the
Hills', but each consumer would likely spend more money
pursuing an individual claim than each stood to collect on that
claim. By pooling their resources in a class action, however,

247 See, e.g., Nancy S. Kim, Evolving Business and Social Norms and
Interpretation Rules: The Need for a Dynamic Approach to Contract Disputes, 84
NEB. L. REV. 506, 528-46 (2005) (discussing how strict application may undermine
goals of contract law and may perpetuate power imbalances).
248 Schmitz, Unconscionability's Safety Net Function, supra note 83 (proposing
that courts embrace unconscionability's flexibility by adding a "safety net" prong to
Professor Leffts widely accepted two-prong analysis); see also Kim, supranote 247, at
554-66 (proposing a "dynamic approach" for interpreting contracts to allow for
consideration of evolving needs and norms).
249 Compare Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248-49 (9th
Cir. 1994) (striking the whole arbitration clause because its unfairness tainted the
entire arbitration process), with Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 148586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reforming AAA arbitration rules applicable under an
employment agreement that required the employee to bear arbitrator fees where
such expenses were likely to prevent the employee from the opportunity to vindicate
her statutory rights).
250 See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussing Hill).
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consumers could obtain some compensation while possibly
251
forcing Gateway to answer for its warranty violations.
Similarly, the so-called "American rule," requiring parties to
bear their own attorney fees and costs, is generally accepted in
the United States. However, this rule can have disproportionate
impacts in extra communal arbitration contexts, which some
courts have acknowledged due to the high up-front costs of
ar'bitration.252 As an initial matter, an outsider to arbitration
may accept an arbitration fee-splitting provision without
realizing its possible ramifications. The outsider may then be
dismayed when arbitration filing and administration costs and
arbitrators' fees not applicable in litigation effectively squelch
any incentive the potential claimant may have had for asserting
253
claims.
Nonetheless, courts should be careful not to assume that feesplitting provisions will be unreasonably harsh. Courts often fail
to fully consider that even apparently high arbitration costs are
still less than what one would pay in total fees litigating the
claims in court. In Porpora,discussed above, for example, the
court understandably was concerned with the estimated $4,000
in fees and costs the homeowner would bear to even attain an
initial hearing in the AAA arbitration prescribed in the
contract. 254 However, the court should have been more careful in
assessing the veracity of the homeowner's unsupported
statement of financial hardship and the possible application of
the AAA rule allowing for deferral or reduction of these fees in
the case of hardship. 255 Moreover, the court did not consider that
litigation of the contract claims would likely cost the homeowners
more than arbitration due to increased time and attorneys'
expenses.
The court assumed procedural and substantive
251 See id.; see also In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 756-58 (Tex.
2001) (denying consumers' claims that an arbitration provision was unconscionable
where the financially bereft consumers would have to pay filing fees of at least
$2,000, $250/day/party hearing fee, and other arbitrator and hearing costs in order
to assert claims regarding a loan agreement).
252 See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 254-55, 676
N.Y.S.2d 569, 574-75 (1st Dep't 1998) (enforcing the Gateway arbitration clause but
voiding designation of ICC arbitration due to excessive costs).
253 See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1483-85 (reforming fee-splitting procedures due to risk
of exorbitant arbitration fees and costs).
254 Porpora v. Gatliff Building Co., 828 N.E.2d 1081, 1085-86 (Ohio Ct. App.
2005).
255 See id.
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unconscionability without appreciating the contracting culture of
25 6
the parties involved.
The substantive fairness of arbitration clause procedures
depends on context and the parties involved. Divergent dispute
resolution understandings and values in more extra communal
cultures may augment power and resource imbalances to allow a
form drafter with disproportionate power to slip harsh
arbitration provisions into a contract. Additionally, the party
without arbitration experience may not realize the significance or
impact of the provision. In more intra communal contracting
cultures, even if parties have disproportionate resources, the
parties often share understandings and interests in private
dispute resolution provided for in a form agreement. In addition,
such forms may require private processes that benefit intra
communal players and foster exchange efficiencies.
CONCLUSION

This is merely the first step in a larger exploration of
contracting culture and its role in the creation and enforcement
of dispute resolution provisions. It recognizes that concerns with
context in enforcing form arbitration provisions are not new, and
continually collide with questions regarding practical and
efficient application.
This Article nonetheless uses the
"contracting culture" continuum to revive principles from legal
realism and relational contracts that have lost luster in the
shadows of law and economics and contract formalism. Real life
contracting encompasses not only bargaining factors, but also the
parties' shared understandings and values regarding resolution
of contract disputes. This goes beyond economic differentials or
conceptions of culture focused on race, ethnicity, and nationality,
and can be applied in both domestic and international contexts.
Furthermore, the continuum analysis this Article proposes of
form arbitration provisions seeks to create structure for
acknowledging how parties' relations, understandings, and
dispute resolution values converge or compete in a particular
exchange. Wealth, race, gender, and ethnicity are important in
analyzing the unconscionability of form arbitration provisions,
but courts should broaden their assumptions to consider the
overall intra or extra communal character of an exchange giving
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rise to a form provision. In intra communal cultures, such as
that in commercial construction contexts, form provisions are
often beneficial due to parties' relations, understandings, and
dispute resolution needs. In extra communal cultures, such as
that in consumer contexts, however, competing understandings
and values may aggravate bargaining imbalances and foster
unfairness of form arbitration provisions.

